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Introduction
I am sure no competent politician has ever done what I have been asked by some  
people to do except under duress, and no politician who has done it in duress 
has ever done so without repenting what he did for the rest of his natural life. 
         (Arthur J. Balfour on the risks of defining policy, 1907)
Political parties face various problems when addressing their voters, the most troubling of which 
originate from policy decisions and commitments they make. What politicians write in their policy 
statements is recorded in the public mind, making it all the more necessary for parties to exercise 
prudence when defining their plans. The most widely distributed of these documents are election 
programmes, more commonly referred to as manifestos, which parties use to set out priorities and 
argue why they and not  their  opponents  should be given the chance to  govern.  While  election 
manifestos represent an important element of political propaganda, there is often more to them than 
meets the eye. For most of the twentieth century British political parties have devoted considerable 
attention to formulating these documents, placing them at the very centre of their policy-making 
efforts.1 Their  gestation  usually  took  months  of  detailed  preparations  in  which  policies  and 
commitments were carefully selected and written down in more or less certain terms. Since the 
specific structure and considerable length of the final product often meant that it had little appeal to 
the average voter, it makes sense to assume that election manifestos served other purposes as well,2 
– particularly those that went beyond outright political propaganda and were concerned with wider 
aspects of policy making, electoral strategy and party management. Nowhere does this mixture of 
purposes seem more apparent than in the case of the Conservative Party,  the dominant force in 
British politics during the twentieth century, which experienced and survived some of the greatest 
shifts in policy direction of any mainstream political group in the post-war period.
The  question  this  thesis  raises  and  tries  to  answer  by  studying  the  example  of  the 
Conservatives  is  why were  election  manifestos  so  important  in  the  process  of  making policy? 
Election  studies  have  generally  undervalued  the  role  manifestos  played  in  determining  party 
1 Barnes, John and Richard Cockett. The Making of Party Policy, in Conservative Century: Conservative Party since 1900, ed. Anthony Seldon, and 
Stuart Ball (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994):  354; Butler, David and Dennis Kavanagh.  The British General Election of 1979  (London: 
Macmillan,1980): 144.
2 Butler, David and Dennis Kavanagh. The British General Election of October 1974 (London: Macmillan, 1975): 54.
3
priorities. While there is a consensus among authors that these documents often serve not one but 
many purposes at the same time, the election manifesto has hardly ever been the subject of study in 
itself.  Previous  research  has  been  fragmented,  with  most  authors  focusing  their  attention  on 
individual election campaigns rather than longer periods of time, effectively reducing manifestos to 
nothing more than simple policy pronouncements. Even less has been written on the subject from 
the viewpoint of conception, with no significant long-term analysis made on how these publications 
came to life under different party administrations. While authors of these same election studies have 
identified the process of preparing manifestos as “as a set of calculations about how to win the 
favour of the electorate”,3 they nevertheless failed to show how the functions of these documents 
developed and evolved through time.
The notion  of  electoral  strategy in  contemporary democratic  political  systems has  been 
described by the economic theorist Anthony Downs as parties competing on ideological grounds 
and consequently investing most of their resources and work in the formation of policy as a mean of 
achieving their main goal – getting elected into office.4 Once the policies are set the focus shifts on 
persuading  the  electorate.  In  the  realm  of  British  politics  the  basis  for  this  was  the  election 
manifesto.5 The amount of work that went into preparing these documents gives an idea about their 
significant role in garnering voter support. But this is only one part of the story. The reality was that 
once the votes  were cast  the election manifesto also functioned as  a  future reference point  for 
judgments on the winner's performance in government. In the words of former Labour minister 
Richard H. Crossman, the point of the manifesto was not to persuade the voter, but “to give yourself 
an anchor” when confronted with opposing views.6  
Whether in government or opposition, the Tories from 1945 onwards used their manifestos 
to  woo the  electorate  by voicing  the  concerns  and  perceptions  that  constituted  the  essence  of 
Conservative thought.  The manifesto represented  an essential  part  of  electoral  strategy.  To this 
extent it was used to sustain the left-right ideological cleavage after the end of the Second World 
War right up to the late 1980s7 when the first signs of Labour's transformation and its subsequent 
3 Butler, David and Dennis Kavanagh.  The British General Election of 1979 (London: Macmillan,1980):144
4 Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957). 35
5 Ibid, 94. The end of the War marked the beginning of the most challenging period in recent British political history. Ideology was a product of post-
war uncertainty developed by parties in their struggle for office. Downs argues that uncertainty gives rise to the possibility of persuasion, as it divides  
voters according to their varying degrees of confidence in their voting decisions, and competition, as parties try their best to accommodate their voters 
preferences. See also: Mansergh, Lucy and Robert Thomson. Election Pledges, Party Competition and Policymaking, Comparative Politics 39 (Apr., 
2007): 311-329. 
6 Harrison, Brian. The Transformation of British Politics 1860-1995 (Oxford etc.: Oxford University Press, 1996): 314
7 The link between voter ideological position and vote choice appears to be weakening in recent years. See also:  Green, Jane and Sara B. Hobolt, 
Owning the issue agenda: Party strategies and vote choices in British elections, Electoral Studies 27 (2008): 460-476.
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shift to the right started to emerge.8 In retrospect, none of this would have happened if the Second 
World War hadn't altered the British political landscape leaving the Conservative Party with no 
other option but to support the policies of the mixed economy and the welfare state. Following their  
surprising election defeat against Labour in 1945, the Conservatives had to change the way they 
functioned and existed in the eyes of their electors. Most of all they had to dismiss old beliefs that  
had little or no prospect of garnering voter support: for instance the assumption that defining policy 
to the electorate brings unnecessary risks every sensible politician should want to avoid.9 What 
Conservative statesmen like Arthur J. Balfour, quoted in the beginning of this introduction, adhered 
to at the start of the century seemed to have no electoral value in the post-war period. Instead, the 
Party decided to  pursue  an  open approach where  the  election  manifesto  became the  centre  of 
attention and the most important product of Conservative policy-making efforts.
 The significance of election manifestos in terms of electoral strategy and party performance 
raises relevant questions concerning the general attitude of parties towards these documents, the 
decisions that stood in the background, the way they resolved issues and conveyed policy to the 
electorate.  In  order  to  understand  how  consecutive  Conservative  Party  leaderships  from  1945 
onwards forged their central policy declarations and how the evolution of Conservative thought 
affected the Party's  manifesto this thesis examines the roles of individuals,  groups and interests 
involved in this process.  
Methodology & Sources
David Butler and other authors of British election studies have for long been observant of some of 
the  limits  to  their  approach.  For  all  the  insight  they bring  forward,  studies  have  focused their 
attention predominantly on the formal election campaign, which usually lasts a short time, while 
offering little or no additional information about the economic, political and social changes that 
might  have  occurred  after  the  last  election  and  influenced  party  and  voter  behaviour  since. 
Furthermore,  such  studies  have  also  suffered  at  the  level  of  haute  politique,  by  having  no 
opportunity to gather any relevant information from private papers that would explain the rationale 
of election decisions.10
8  Sanders, D. The impact of left-right ideology. in: Critical Elections: British Parties and Voters in Long-Term Perspective, ed. Evans, G., Norris, 
(London: Sage1999): 181-182.
9  Conservative Policy, The Times, September 29th 1951.
10 Butler, David and Donald Stokes. Political change in Britain: Forces Shapping Electoral Choice (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969): 15.
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With the opening of archives this issue no longer poses a significant problem. Private papers 
from Party officials, ranging from Prime Ministers to research officers, that had been previously 
closed to the public now offer new insight into the way election decisions were made at the top 
level. The release of Cabinet and private records up to 1983 gives researchers a chance to contribute 
additional knowledge and understanding of the role election manifestos played in determining party 
policy. The characteristics of this process, which were outlined by previous studies, can now be 
discussed and analysed in depth.11
Ways  to  examine  the  changes  in  attitude  of  the  Conservatives  towards  their  manifesto 
involved tracing the process of preparing these documents from start to finish, which was achieved 
by looking at  aspects  such as  the  positions  of  individual  party members  and larger  groups  on 
questions of policy and the way their ideas were integrated in the final drafts of various general 
election manifestos. On the other hand, the thesis looks at long-term policies associated with the 
post-war economic consensus, like the push for full employment, which offered interesting ground 
for examining how a changing balance of power inside the Party can affect the way a certain policy 
is presented to the electorate. By examining how different administrations treated the policy of full 
employment in their manifestos, the thesis explains the significant role these publications played in 
determining whether a policy existed or not.  From these aspects similarities and differences can be 
drawn to give a sense about how the Conservative manifesto came to life under different Party 
leaderships.
Each of the twelve Conservative general election manifestos published between 1945 and 
1983 is approached with a set of questions about their content, origins, authorship, implications and 
relation to the past. This thesis tries to determine who were the authors; who was involved in the 
drafting process; was the leadership open to suggestions; what were the differences between the 
first and the final draft; who's opinion counted; what party resources were used; what policies were 
used; were they consistent with the past; was it divisive or did it help strengthen the party etc. Issues 
are structured and presented chronologically; the thesis consists of three sections, roughly dividing 
the second half of the twentieth century into decade long periods. Each of the sections looks at how 
the Conservatives framed their central policy declarations and how the changes in Conservative 
thought affected this process: they start with an examination of the party organization and general 
attitude towards policy making, the politics of persuasion and the role of policy publications before 
moving on to the manifestos of that particular period – the way they originated, the way they were  
structured both in terms of form and content, and the effect they had on the Party itself.
11Even though Conservative Party records dating up to 1984 are opened to the public they still remain the property of individual party members or 
their legal descendants. As most historians and students of history know, copyrights make quoting official documents a rather troublesome task. If 
researchers wish to quote official party documents they require written permission of the copy wright owner. Of course, there are ways around these 
rules. The most eloquent solution, which this thesis employs heavily, is to paraphrase the material. Paraphrasing requires no formal permission. For 
further details see the webpage of the Conservative Party Archive at http://www.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/cpa/regulations/copyright.
6
The  first  section,  starting  in  1945,  deals  with  the  Party  under  Winston  Churchill,  its 
surprising electoral defeat after the end of the War and its return to government six years later. The 
second part  examines  the  Party and its  manifestos  under  Churchill's  successors  Anthony Eden, 
Harold  Macmillan  and  Alec  Douglas-Home  as  well  as  the  years  the  Conservatives  spent  in 
opposition in the second half of 1960s. The last part is dedicated to the difficult period of the 1970s'  
when  the  Party  was  run  by  Edward  Heath,  and  provides  an  examination  of  the  changes  the 
Conservatives endured under the first Thatcher administration leading up to Mrs. Thatcher's second 
consecutive  election  win  in  1983.  Part  of  the  reasoning  behind  these  dates  has  already  been 
explained in the introduction: it takes into account the end of the Second World War that brought 
major political, social and economic changes to Britain, leaving the Conservative Party no other 
choice but to support the policies of the mixed economy and the welfare state. Little more than three 
decades later the Party faced a similar situation, the only difference being that this time the Tories, 
and not Labour, were those who would be implementing change. Under the leadership of Margaret 
Thatcher the Party brought a definitive end to what was left of the post-war political and economic 
consensus, opening the door to an even greater ideological divide between the left and right. By 
1983, Thatcherism was showing all of its positive and negative aspects.
To provide answers to the questions above the thesis relies on primary and secondary source 
material,  attained  from the  Conservative  Party  Archives  and  the  Churchill  Archive  Centre.  In 
addition to Conservative Party general election manifestos, the research focuses on minutes from 
party and government meetings that specifically dealt with manifestos; personal papers from party 
leaders, including manifesto drafts; and correspondence between party leaders and aides. Additional 
primary sources, which are used to fill potential gaps that arose during research, include memoirs of 
prime ministers and their aides, studies by the influential Conservative Research Department (CRD) 
and personal papers from the men who ran it.
The most important of the sources used are papers from leaders of the Party and their aides 
along with  correspondence  between the  members  of  the  CRD. These  documents  provide  good 
insight  into the organization of the Party,  the attitudes and beliefs of its  members,  and various 
problems everyone involved had to address along the way. It should be pointed out, however, that  
not everything was included in these volumes mostly for reasons of confidentiality. Some of the 
records of intraparty correspondence which date back more than thirty years still remain closed. To 
complement official Party documents, secondary sources consisted mainly of newspaper articles, 
published  in  the  weeks  and  months  running  up  to  a  general  election.  These  provided  further 
information about election strategies, party preparations, and the individuals involved in the drafting 
process.  
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Historiography of the Conservative Manifesto
Previous  research  on  the  subject,  as  indicated,  consists  of  political  studies  of  British  general 
elections  since  1945  along  with  wide  ranging  accounts  of  twentieth  century  British  politics. 
Furthermore it includes histories of Conservative Party institutions, like the Conservative Research 
Department, which seemingly played an incremental role in the preparation of policy ever since its 
foundation  during  the  interwar  period.  Many  of  these  accounts  imply  that  the  history  of  the 
manifesto ended in the early 1950s when the Party adopted a more open approach to policy-making, 
and that from that moment on the manifesto, and the purpose it was designed for, remained static. 
None of these works examines the role manifestos played in later years, and most of them fail to go  
beyond the sphere of political propaganda in their attempts to explain the efforts that went into the 
production of these publications.
Previous research, however scarce, shows how preparing a general election manifesto has 
been an exercise in party management, reflecting both a balance of power and a set of calculations 
about how to win the favour of the electorate”. David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh's study of the 
British General election of 1979, in which the authors trace Margaret Thatcher's assent to the post of 
Prime Minister  and offer  some explanations  about  how and why this  came about,  provides  an 
analysis of different party manifestos published during the 1979 election campaign and shows how 
these represent part of the ritual of British democracy. Butler and Kavanagh's study compared the 
Tory,  Labour and Liberal  manifestos  by focusing on the policy perspective,  while  also delving 
deeper into the process of preparing each individual publication. For all the conflicting purposes 
they are often designed, manifestos can function as double-edged swords; parties have no other 
option but to take them seriously so they can, in the event of electoral victory, claim they have a  
mandate for their proposals.12 According to the authors, the Conservative manifesto up to that point 
“remained  a  product  of  party  traditions,  personal  preferences,  previous  policy  commitments, 
reactions to other party manifestos, and political circumstances of the time”. These influences, to a 
degree represented in the content of Conservative programmes dating back to at least 1945, varied 
from election to election.13
This wasn't the first time Butler and Kavanagh wrote about various types of influences. In 
their  study  of  the  1974  general  election,  which  the  Conservatives  lost,  they  emphasize  the 
importance of parties' ideologies and traditions as well as differences in organization and structure 
12  Butler, David and Dennis Kavanagh.  The British General Election of 1979 (London: Macmillan,1980):144.
13 Ibid.: 155-156
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in the process of preparing manifestos.14 In his review of British general elections between 1945 
and 1987 at the end of the eighties, Butler gives a short account of the importance of the manifesto 
in British politics as a promissory note. The idea that there should be moral and political pressure on 
politicians  to  exercise  prudence  in  making  promises,  and  to  keep  them when  made,  for  him 
indicated that “the fiction of the mandate has its value”.15 Along with his co-authors, Butler is one 
of the rare writers to single out this seemingly important aspect of manifesto-writing.
Unlike Butler, historians of the Conservative Party tend to be less interested in content and 
party organization, focusing most of their attention on the structure and appearance of the manifesto 
instead.  John  Barnes  and  Richard  Cockett's  account  of  Conservative  policy  making  offers  a 
somewhat short description of how the Conservative manifesto changed through time. While the 
authors delve deeper into history by tracing the origins of the manifesto, the only examples they 
discuss in detail are publications issued under the leadership of Winston Churchill and Margaret 
Thatcher. The problem with their analysis lies in the fact that manifestos are discussed only in the 
context of political propaganda. By focusing on important years like 1951 when the Party finally 
realized it needed to change the way it presented policies to the electorate, the authors forget to look 
at how these changes in approach affected electoral strategy and party organization. The same year 
Churchill was quoted as saying: “It is not so much a programme we require as a theme. We are  
concerned with a lighthouse not a shop window.” Was he merely talking about publicity or wider 
issues of political  strategy and party management? By the end of the decade,  according to  the 
authors, a stable pattern was emerging in the way the Conservative manifesto came to life.16
Barnes and Cockett  unfortunately fail  to describe the nature of this  pattern in any great 
detail. The do, however, mention Conservative Party institutions such as the Conservative Research 
Department and the Advisory Committee on Policy and the significant role they played in the Tory 
policy mechanism, as well as in the production of manifestos. Most of their conclusions are based 
on  John  Ramsden's  history  of  the  Conservative  Research  Department  in  which  the  leading 
Conservative Party historian places the CRD at the heart of the Party's professional policy making 
machinery. Ramsden explains how “almost all that was said, published or broadcasted in the name 
of the Conservative Party was in some way affected by the Department's work, and how much of it 
was  actually  written  there”.  In  his  analysis  he  poses  some  interesting  dilemmas  about  the 
relationship between the CRD and the leadership of the Party, including the difficulty of defining 
where Conservative power actually lies. Unlike most of the authors described in this overview, he 
14 Butler, David and Dennis Kavanagh. The British General Election of October 1974 (London: Macmillan, 1975): 54-55.
15 Butler, David. British General Elections since 1945 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989): 87.
16 Barnes, John and Richard Cockett. The Making of Party Policy, in Conservative Century: Conservative Party since 1900, ed. Anthony Seldon, and 
Stuart Ball (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 354-357.
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delves deeper in the organizational aspects of policy making, explaining how the Tories have “no 
binding rules on the central question of the leader's authority when it comes to determining policy 
priorities. Still, he fails to offer the same level of insight when it comes to the differences in the 
roles  the  Party leader  and the  members  of  the  CRD had  in  the  process  of  preparing  election 
manifestos. While Ramsden argues that the CRD remained one of the most important elements in 
the Party's policy making network for more than half of a century, he nevertheless concedes that 
“Conservative policy making remains a grey area, partly because it is not easy to say what that  
policy is  at  any one time.”17 This  notion  alone  has  significant  implications  for  what  the Party 
expects to achieve with its manifestos. As the following chapters will try to show, the tendency of 
the Conservative Party to change its policy position makes disclosing priorities even more difficult 
than it  already is. A similar argument can be found in Alistair  Cooke's  short  description of the 
evolution of the Conservative manifesto. The journalist's rather superficial analysis results in an 
interesting conclusion about the difficulties that go into producing manifestos, from the gathering of 
ideas to the writing of policies, which he describes as the chief lesson to be learned from studying 
these documents. Cooke argues the difficulties “only become overwhelming when a party lacks 
clarity of purpose”.18 This is where his argument and explanation stop, leaving readers no other 
option  but  to  wonder  how  the  Conservatives  dealt  with  this  recurring  problem that  seems  to 
represent an inherent part of their style of politics.
The following chapters will address this issue while the study tries to make sense of the 
many conflicting purposes of the Conservative manifesto that historians have so far neglected to 
examine  in  their  writings.  The  post-war  policy  making  exercise,  indeed,  presents  the  most 
interesting  period  for  researching  the  various  aspects  of  election  programmes.  Tracing  and 
examining the history of the Conservative manifesto will hopefully bring new understanding to the 
way these documents influenced contemporary British politics.
17 Ramsden, John. The Making of Conservative Party Policy (London : HarperCollins, 1980): 2-5.
18 Cooke, Alistair B. Introduction, in Conservative Party General Election Manifestos 1900-1997, by Iain Dale (Abingdon: Routledge 2000).
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1. Lessons Learned: The Churchill Years
 
1.1 The benefits of being opposition
In order to understand what the role of the manifesto was in the context of the new approach to 
Conservatism that followed the Party's electoral defeat in 1945 it is necessary to address some of 
the difficulties of defining what Conservative policy was and who had the power to make it, similar  
to what Ramsden did in his analysis of the history of the Conservative Research Department. He 
was the first to point out the fact that the Conservative Party in general had no binding rules for the 
leader's role in the making of policy. In other words, there was no clear definition of how policy 
came to life. Even though Ramsden acknowledges that the Conservatives were traditionally more 
oriented towards their leaders than other mainstream political parties, it is nevertheless hard for him 
to accept the official Tory line that all policy decisions were made by a single person. In reality, he 
writes, the role of the leader and the Conservatives approach to policy making was much more 
complex.1
Ramsden's analysis shows that the Party essentially lived a double life, projecting an image 
of strength and coherence on the outside while having no desire to share internal differences and 
disputes with the rest of the country. The task of the leader was not to exert total control over policy 
decisions,  but  to  manage this  double life  in  such a way that  would not  jeopardize the internal 
stability and bring the Party closer to its final goal. For quite a long time Winston Churchill, both as  
a  person and politician more fascinated with the world  scene  than  “bread and butter”  politics, 
seemed unfit to fulfil this task. His contempt and indifference for the role he had to play as the 
Leader of the Opposition after Labour took over governing the country in 1945 is well documented. 
Interestingly, this did not have much an effect on Churchill's standing within his own Conservative 
ranks. In the six years it took the Tories to regain lost ground and return to Government he remained 
in  complete  control  of  all  segments  of  the  Party,  be  it  the  Conservative  front  bench,  the 
Parliamentary Party or various agencies.2
Churchill's character certainly had an effect on the Party and how it approached the issues of 
electoral nature. Lord Hailsham's claim, that Churchill never saw the need for presenting policy to 
the  electorate  in  any definitive  form or  fashion,  simply because  he  believed  that  his  personal 
qualities, or those of any politician that possessed outstanding courage and leadership skills, were 
1 Ramsden, John. The Making of Conservative Party Policy (London : HarperCollins, 1980): 2
2 Theakston, Kevin. Winston Churchill 1945-51, in Leaders of the Opposition: From Churhchill to Cameron, ed. Timothy Heppell (Basingstoke etc. : 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012): 12-13; Blake, Robert. The Conservative Party from Peel to Thatcher (London: Methuen, 1985): 258.
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enough to win the Party the votes it needed to return to Government, in retrospect nevertheless 
seems exaggerated, especially for the time Churchill headed the National Government during the 
War. Stuart Ball's explanation, that the Prime Minister was opposed to anything which tended to 
emphasize separateness and could, in Churchill's mind, derail the efforts and unity of the wartime 
coalition,3 makes much more sense both in light of the PM's motives and his history as a career 
politician, who understood very well the pitfalls of party politics. In retrospect, historians would see 
him  as  much  of  an  asset  as  a  burden  to  the  functioning  of  the  Conservative  policy-making 
machinery, while some members of the Party proclaimed him to be one of the prime causes of the 
election  disaster.  The  Conservatives,  as  the  result  in  1945  would  show,  suffered  heavily  from 
Churchill's tactics; still, not everything was his fault. The fact that the Party was associated with 
issues such as unemployment, depression and failure to prevent war, and that it had lost credibility 
in  the eyes  of  much of  the  British voters4 who were desperate  for  change,  would constitute  a 
problem with or without Churchill in the leader's seat. The truth was the Party was not only lagging 
behind Labour in terms of policy but also in its ability to persuade.
The  new  political  landscape  in  which  the  Conservatives  found  themselves  unusually 
challenged by Labour would soon force the Party to define its position on the same policies of the 
welfare state that it had avoided in the last election. For the Conservatives to regain credibility, they 
needed a new, more effective approach to policy making, one that would correct the mistakes of the 
past and bring the party more in line with public opinion. The situation, some members agreed, 
called for a new 'Tamworth Manifesto',5 where the Party would embrace the new political and social 
reality of the post-war period. Their proposal was based on the idea that an abrupt break with the 
past was just what the Party needed to regain its confidence and control over the country.
While most in the Party saw the defeat of 1945 as an opportunity lost, others, including the 
leader’s wife, felt differently. Clementine Churchill's remark about the 1945 defeat as a “blessing in 
disguise”, which Butler years later described as prophetic, was certainly an accurate description of 
things  to  come,  both  in  terms  of  organization  and  the  Party's  relationship  with  the  public. 
Conservatives began thinking differently about passing their solutions on to the electorate, while at 
the same time laying more emphasis on making 'positive policy'.  These steps would eventually 
culminate in publications, such as the Industrial Charter and the Right Road for Britain, and later in 
the 1950 and 1951 general election manifestos.
3 Ball, Stuart. Portrait of a Party: The Conservative Party in Britain 1918-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002): 324; Hailsham 1990, 234
4 Blake, Robert. The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill (London: Methuen, 1970): 254-255; Cooke, Alistair B. Introduction, in Conservative  
Party General Election Manifestos 1900-1997, by Iain Dale (Abingdon: Routledge 2000).
5Sir Robert Peel's manifesto, launched in Tamworth in 1834, marked the start of modern Conservatism. In it, Peel combined the idea of moderate  
political reform with a strong belief in traditional institutions. For more information visit http://www.conservapedia.com/Tamworth_Manifesto
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The  change  in  attitude  towards  declaring  policy  in  detail  is  hard  to  recreate  on  paper, 
especially when the entire party organization is taken into account. What can be said of the process 
of change in general is that it was only natural for the Conservatives to embrace a new kind of 
structure, since the values for which the old pre-1939 Party stood for became dated after the War 
ended.6 After 1945 there simply existed no reasonable case for restoring the old party structure or 
continuing most of the policies associated with the inter-war years. This reaction to defeat was an 
instructive example of the Conservatives attitude towards change. When the Party confronted a 
similar issue in the 1970s, Ian Gilmour tried to answer it by quoting Lord Salisbury who in 1883 
said that the object of the Party was not, and should not be, simply to keep things as they are:7
“In the first place the enterprise is impossible. In the next place, there is much in  
our present mode of thought and action which it is highly undesirable to conserve.”
Even though some contemporary accounts suggest this was not entirely true, especially when it 
came to policy, the organizational changes the Party pursued were genuinely innovative.8  It did 
seem, at least for a while, that the election of 1945 would not change anything. Churchill remained 
convinced that there was no need for the Opposition to spell its domestic policy in detail, putting it 
simply that this was solely the task of the Government. His refusal to spell out policies for fear they 
would commit a future Conservative Government9 implies that the leader fully acknowledged the 
political risk brought about by policy declarations, but instead of accepting this risk and working 
around it he simply continued to ignore it in the same way his predecessor Alfred J. Balfour did 
some four decades earlier.
Defeat at the polls, for all the shock it caused for the Party and its leadership, brought about 
a period of modernization, enhanced by a new found appreciation for policy research. The Party's 
policy-making machinery, which had come to a complete stop during the Second World War, did 
not fully revive itself until more than a year after the 1945 election, while it took even longer to 
produce any significant piece of legislation. According to Blake, party reorganization involved a 
constitutional  reshuffle,  change  of  committee  nomenclatures  and relationships,  and a  move for 
better representation of Party sentiment.10 Changes were observed on all levels: the front bench, the 
Parliamentary  Party  and  agencies,  such  as  the  Conservative  Research  Department  and  the 
Conservative Political Centre, became more interconnected, their actions more coherent. The 'Two-
6 Ramsden, John. The Age of Churchill and Eden (London etc.: Longman,1995). 94-95; Ramsden, John. The Making of Conservative Party Policy 
(London : HarperCollins, 1980). 102; Butler, R.A. The Art of the Possible: The Memoirs of Lord Butler (London : Hamilton: 1971): 126
7 Butler, R.A. The Art of the Possible: The Memoirs of Lord Butler (London : Hamilton: 1971): 122.
8 Bale, Tim. The Conservatives since 1945: The Drivers of Party Change (Oxford: Oxforf University Press, 2012): 14.
9 Ramsden, John. The Making of Conservative Party Policy (London : HarperCollins, 1980): 108.
10 Blake, Robert. The Conservative Party from Peel to Thatcher (London: Methuen, 1985): 259.
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Way Movement of Ideas', a concept originally proposed by Butler, made the Conservative Central 
Office more accessible, or so it was claimed. The flow of ideas, as Butler recalled in his memoirs, 
shortly took on a life of its own, opening the Party to rank-and-file members from various parts of 
the country that now had the opportunity to  contribute to  the shaping of this  new approach to 
Conservatism.11
The expansion of research also fostered new appreciation for producing policy declarations. 
Preparations for what would eventually become the 1950 General Election Manifesto date back to 
at least 1949. It is difficult, however, to pin point the exact date when the Party started talking about 
the next general election or the specifics of the next manifesto. It is highly unlikely that such a date 
even existed,  since the policy-making machinery after  1946 never  really stopped working.  The 
Manifesto, which in many ways celebrated the Party's newly found coherence, was largely based on 
the most seminal publication produced during that era – the Industrial Charter. The Conservatives 
wrote  the  Charter  to  assure  their  voters  that  modern  Conservatism  would,  in  the  interest  of 
efficiency, full employment and social security, support the idea of a mixed economy.12 Historians 
of the Conservative Party would later judge it not by its content but the signal it sent to both the 
electorate and the Party itself.13 The Charter, despite its success and important role in defying the 
new approach to Conservatism, attracted a significant amount of opposition from inside the Party, 
some members rejecting it as nothing more than 'pink conservatism'. To the relief of its authors, the 
Party finally adopted  the  Charter  as  part  of  its  official  policy during 1947 annual  Conference. 
Before it was distributed to the wider public, Churchill, who also had his doubts about the Charter's 
implications at first but quickly came to accept it, wrote a foreword, which, according to Ramsden, 
meant that the opponents were defeated and that there was no going back.14 
The ideas represented in the Industrial Charter two years later culminated in the launch of 
the  Right  Road  for  Britain,  which  took the  title  of  the  most  comprehensive  publication  to  be 
presented to the country since the Party entered the ranks of opposition. Two years after the launch 
of the Industrial  Charter the Conservative Conference approved the text that would become the 
basis for the Party's next programme. The Conference showed that the Party was now ready and 
willing to go to the polls and face an election with Labour. Before Butler reassured the members 
that the Party was fully able to produce a manifesto at once, he delivered an emotional case for a 
new approach to Conservatism. The Times summed up his words:
11 Butler, R.A. The Art of the Possible: The Memoirs of Lord Butler (London : Hamilton: 1971): 137.
12 Ibid.: 146.
13 Bale, Tim. The Conservatives since 1945: The Drivers of Party Change (Oxford: Oxforf University Press, 2012): 30-31.
14 Ramsden, John. The Age of Churchill and Eden (London etc.: Longman,1995): 158.
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The Right Road for Britain was a policy of humanity and common sense: humanity  
because  it  associated  the  Conservative  Party  with  the  spiritual,  human,  and  
physical  needs  of  our  population,  and common sense  because  it  had used  the  
instrument of change where change was in the national interests and accepted  
economic facts where they were unanswerable and irrevocable.15
Butler's  speech in essence confirmed where the framework for the next manifesto would come 
from. Despite the success of the Conference, observers remained convinced the Party still had a lot 
of work to do to get its message straight. The Right Road for Britain, as the Spectator commented 
not long after it was published, was an “excellent document”, despite the fact that it lacked any 
significant  commitment  on the part  of the Conservatives for producing a  fight  to  win the next 
election. For everything the Party and the current Government had in common, there still remained 
a number of issues where their approaches differed, and these, the newspaper pointed out, were not 
emphasized enough. The conclusion was that there was no reason anymore for the Opposition to 
remain quiet on issues that showed Labour's incompetence in governing the country and that the 
Right Road didn't bring the Conservatives any closer to victory than they were before.16
What the article proposed was something the Party wasn't prepared to put forward, at least 
not in a way that would please the Press or many of its  constituents. When the Manifesto was 
finally published a year later it left a lot to wish for. It was perfectly clear that the Right Road for 
Britain was its main source of inspiration. Titled This is the Road, it preserved the spirit of the 1949 
publication which some in the Press described as an “anodyne in that shade of pale blue which most 
nearly approaches pink”.17 Ramsden's account of how the 1950 Manifesto came about refers to the 
fact that the final draft contained a far smaller number of clear promises that the Party made in the 
Right Road for Britain. For some members, this was a mistake. The decision to name the manifesto 
This is the Road with the turn of fortunes only emphasized the extent to which the Party had been  
compelled to re-examine its tactics and policies. The Conservatives desperately wanted to avoid 
focusing the public's attention on something other than the mistakes of the Labour Government 
which in their view threatened the economic and financial stability of the country. An aggressive 
campaign, they feared, could undermine the Party's efforts and threaten its overall performance.18
In the end it would take not one but two general elections for Churchill and the Party to win 
back the trust  of the British electorate.  The task of writing both the 1950 as well  as the 1951 
15 'Right Road' Approved, The Times, October 15th 1949.
16 Right Road?, Spectator, July 28th 1949.
17 Ibid.; Butler, R.A. The Art of the Possible: The Memoirs of Lord Butler (London : Hamilton: 1971): 152
18 Ramsden, John. The Making of Conservative Party Policy (London : HarperCollins, 1980): 142.
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Manifesto proved to be challenging, although the most difficult exercise – the making of policy – 
was completed more than a year before the first of the manifestos was published. The solid body of 
policy and a method for effectively presenting it to the electorate were two key components of 
success that would allow the Party to stay in power for the next thirteen years.19
1.2 The long road
The differences between the 1945 and 1950 Conservative Manifesto were significant. The former, 
titled Mr. Churchill's Declaration of Policy to the Electors, was to be the last one that took a more 
personalized form. Five years later the Conservative manifesto would become a statement of policy 
on behalf of the whole Party, breaking with tradition that appeared in the late nineteenth century 
when the Conservatives first started issuing personal election addresses made by the Leader.20 To 
understand how and why this  break occurred,  it  is  necessary to trace some of the steps in the 
process of preparing This is the Road and the 1951 Manifesto that allowed the Party to return to  
office.
From a purely functional perspective the 1945 Declaration of Policy to the Electors was 
overshadowed in the election campaign by Churchill himself, who decided to engage aggressively 
with his Labour rivals, not realizing this would only hurt the Party in the end.21 The Manifesto, 
drafted by the Research Department, that at the time consisted of only four people, two of which 
were secretaries, was combative in language and style. Much of its content, however, was similar to  
what  Labour  had  to  offer.  The  fact  that  both  parties  were  part  of  the  Coalition  Government 
influenced much of what they were willing to offer.22 Five years later the authors would be the 
same; the Party and the organization surrounding it, however, would be different.
The first draft of the 1950 Manifesto was prepared by David Clarke of the Conservative 
Research Department in early December that previous year. Clarke's correspondence with Percy 
Cohen,  fellow  joint  Director  of  the  CRD,  and  a  group  of  research  officers,  consisting  of  Ian 
Macleod,  Reginald  Maudling  and  Brigadier  Blunt,  started  when  Clarke  reached  out  to  his 
colleagues,  and  asked  them  to  share  their  thoughts  on  the  first  draft,  specifically  on  three 
predetermined points of view. These were the general line of the document; the relative importance 
19 Ibid.: 142.
20 Barnes, John and Richard Cockett. The Making of Party Policy, in Conservative Century: Conservative Party since 1900, ed. Anthony Seldon, and 
Stuart Ball (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994): 354-355.
21 Charmley, John. A History of Conservative Politics, 1900-1996 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996):120-121
22 Ramsden, John. The Making of Conservative Party Policy (London : HarperCollins, 1980): 102.
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of different subjects; and the actual content of each section.23 The fact that the first draft of the 
manifesto contained many “try outs” in possible policy, i.e. the abolition of certain Ministries, cuts 
in food subsidies, both for domestically produced and imported food, reforms in the Health services 
etc., and that certain proposals that were included in the Right Road for Britain would be subject to 
a caveat about the financial position,24 shows how the body a policy was more susceptible to change 
as the day of the election got closer.  
Within a week Clarke received answers from at least three of his peers. The comments from 
Cohen  and Macleod  were  the  most  interesting  in  their  criticism,  because  they contained  more 
general notions of what an election manifesto should look like and what its purpose should be. 
Cohen, after congratulating Clarke for his well-written draft, immediately touched upon the rather 
technical issues of length and style. For the manifesto to be published textually by the Press and that 
the public could read it with ease, it needed to be shorter. Stylistically it needed to be clearer and 
different from the Right Road that the Party published only months before. Cohen's biggest fear 
seemed to be that Clarke's draft may invite criticism that it was a refined version of the 'Right 
Road'.25 Macleod,  in  contrast,  thought  that  the  general  line  of  the  document  was  excellent, 
particularly  the  proposals  related  to  solving  the  financial  and  economic  crisis  that  the  Labour 
government had no appropriate answer for. For him, Housing was the only section in need of re-
evaluation in light of new calculations that showed some parts of the proposed programme could 
lead to unwanted pressure on scarce building materials. Even though Housing was one of the main 
themes developed by the Party in the Right Road for Britain, Macleod thought there was no need 
for being too rigid about keeping it in the Manifesto in its entirety.26 He would nevertheless make it 
a  point to  also support  a clearer and open approach.  Macleod reminded Clarke of the political 
importance of securing and sticking to the themes developed by the Party. Restrictions on “try out” 
issues, such as the abolition of ministries, cuts in the food subsidies, and reforms in the Health 
Service would in his view place the Party's representatives in a difficult position, in which they 
wouldn't be able to put forward a new and coherent approach to social services.27 The fear was this 
would be seen as lack of a general commitment to reform.
Macleod's comments reflected a prevailing public image of an Opposition, susceptible to 
backpedalling and U-turns. The fact that the solid body of policy prepared by the Party could be 
23 Clarke to Cohen, Macleod, Maudling and Blunt, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archive: shelfmark: CRD 2/48/13
24 Rab Butler internal memo, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archive: shelfmark: CRD 2/48/13
25 Cohen in a memorandum to Clarke, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archive: shelfmark: CRD 2/48/13
26 Macleod in a memorandum to Clarke, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archive: shelfmark:CRD 2/48/13
27 Ibid.
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modified  accordingly  to  the  changing  economic  situation  in  the  country  stirred  much  more 
controversy among contemporaries  than it  did among historians decades  later.  Labour used the 
disinclination of some Conservatives to be committed to any prepared policy as a political weapon, 
doing its best to portray the Opposition's approach as opportunistic. This is not to say Labour's own 
approach to declaring policy was any more transparent. The Times, commenting on the feud in 
early 1950, took the side of the Conservatives, defending their approach, while criticizing Labour 
for “having too closely defined a policy, too rigidly imposed upon Ministers and by Ministers upon 
Parliament”.28
These  exchanges  provide  an  instructive  example  of  the  most  pressing  issues  the  Party 
needed to address before it could publish its manifesto. On the one side it wanted to be careful not 
to give hostages to fortune; on the other hand it needed to provide Candidates with convincing 
material that would enable them to campaign effectively. The Conservatives experienced a similar 
problem  in  1945,  when  the  preparation  of  the  Manifesto  was  taking  too  long,  making  the 
Candidates nervous. In a letter to Churchill, Ralph Assheton, the Party Chairman, complained how 
difficult it was for people to conduct the campaign until the Manifesto was published.29 Although 
this  was purely a time issue,  it  nevertheless showed the strong connection between the general 
campaign and the policy boundaries set out in the Manifesto. This of course did not help solve the 
many  problems  of  the  1945  publication,  which,  among  other  things,  suffered  from a  lack  of 
substance. Five years later most officers of the Research Department did not wish to revisit that 
mistake.
Similar views were shared by Conservative representatives in Parliament, such as Richard 
Law, the son of former Party Leader and Prime Minister Andrew Bonar Law, who was an MP for 
Kensington South. Days after meeting Churchill in person, he wrote to him about the need for a 
stronger Conservative theme, one that would differentiate the Party in the eyes of electors from 
what the alternative option had to offer. He believed that some proposals would strike electors as 
only variations of what the Government was prepared to offer. The MP was convinced that people 
in the industrial north would only vote Conservative if they were afraid of a future under socialism 
or if the Party could offer them a viable alternative, embedded in a completely different theme. He 
would propose one based on freedom.30 For people like Butler and Law being factual and positive 
meant being convincing. The one person they needed to persuade was the Leader of the Party. In a  
letter  sent  to  Churchill,  Butler  expressed how inevitable  and desirable  it  would be to keep the 
28 Parties and Policies, The Times. January 21st 1950.
29 Asshton to Churchill, Cambridge, Churchill Archive Centre: shelfmark: CHUR2/554
30 Law to Churchill, Cambridge, Churchill Archive Centre: shelfmark: CHUR 2/89
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manifesto in as factual and definitive style as possible.31 It was obvious that Churchill still  had 
reservations about certain aspects of the publication. Party members were relieved every time they 
were successful at persuading him to agree to a chapter or passage they wrote.32 Churchill made no 
secret that he wanted to be in control of the process and have the final word when it came to the 
content. Butler recalled in his memoirs how he would meet with the Leader on several occasions to 
discuss the Manifesto. The meetings would drag on for hours, with Churchill “shredding to bits 
every discrepancy, ellipsis or muddled metaphor”.33 The reasoning behind such a cautious approach 
originated from his own and his predecessors’ mistakes. Butler remembered a piece of Churchill's 
advice:
He warned me never in policy statements to postulate premises into single lines 
or  generalize  on vital  issues;  reminding me how in 1905 Lord Spencer  had  
tacked on to a disparate thought “Nor must we forget Ireland”, thus bringing  
down devastating and irremediable ruin on his head.34
Churchill's words summed up a problem nobody in the Party in early December 1949 seemed to 
have an answer for: How to give the electors what they want without promising them something 
that a future Conservative Government wouldn't be able to deliver? Before the start of the new year 
the Advisory Committee on Policy (ACP), a successor of the Post-war Problems Central Committee 
(PWPCC), which would lay at the heart  of the Conservative Party for more than twenty years, 
turned down Clarke's draft of the manifesto, criticizing it for being too long and weak in expression. 
The Committee assigned the Research Department to re-write the original draft in a completely 
different form, with an introductory essay that would attack the record of the Labour Government 
by highlighting the problems of Socialism, and a second part that would serve as a catalogue of 
proposals and steps the Party would take.35
31 In his letter, Butler referred to one particular dilemma regarding the layout of the manifesto. There was a possibility that the Party would publish  
the  document  in  two parts:  signed by Churchill,  the  first  part  would  take  the  form of  an essay,  in  which the  Conservatives  would  attack the  
Government's record and offer a viable alternative to the policies of the past five years; the second part would look more like a detailed catalogue,  
where voters would be given the chance to read about the entire range of Conservative policy priorities. As the content of the letter reveals, Butler  
tried to convince Churchill that the first and second part should be published as a single document and that the former should be as factual and  
definitive in style as the latter. The fact that their correspondence even took place clearly shows that the Party was not in any way united behind  
Butler's idea of a more open approach. For more details see Cambridge, Churchill Archive Centre: shelfmark: reference: CHUR 2/89.
32 In a letter to David Clarke dated January 20 th 1950, Maxwell Fyfe, one of the members of Churchill's Shadow Cabinet, described how he, Anthony 
Eden,  Harold  Macmillan,  Rab Butler  and two officers  of  the  Research Department  successfully drafted the  part  of  the  1950 manifesto which  
concerned the price of food. Fyfe underlined the efforts that went into the preparation of the passage and the fact that the group of men convinced  
Churchill to agree to it, despite the fact that the leader showed no enthusiasm for the work they had done. For more a more detailed account see  
Oxford, Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archive: shelfmark:CRD 3/48/24.
33 Butler, R.A. The Art of the Possible: The Memoirs of Lord Butler (London : Hamilton: 1971): 152.
34 Ibid., 152
35 PBH to the Leader of the Party,  Oxford, Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archive: shelfmark:  CRD 2/48/15; For more information on the 
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The first version of the Manifesto to bear the title This is the Road was circulated between 
officers  of  the Research Department  in  early January.  The comments Clarke received from his 
colleagues still focused on the factual side of the argument, but this time some were critical of the 
high number of positive proposals included in the draft. Reginald Maudling worried that the Party, 
“promising to establish a plethora of new boards, committees and inquiries”, looked even more like 
it was desperately trying to avoid making definitive choices.36 There were also other issues. The 
growing  economic  and  financial  troubles  prevented  the  Research  Department  from  including 
definitive  data  in  the  draft,  while  the  changing  economic  landscape,  it  seemed,  also  started 
threatening some of the Party's long-term policy priorities.
The policy of full  employment,  which represented one of the hallmarks of the post-war 
consensus, was already prominently mentioned in the 1945 Manifesto, where the Party stated that it  
intended to avoid the “disastrous slumps and booms” from which the country used to suffer during 
previous  Conservative  administrations  and  that  one  of  the  Government’s  primary  aims  and 
responsibilities should be “the maintenance of a high and stable level of employment”.37 Yet, in 
early 1950, the Tories were far from convinced that the policy could remain unchanged during the 
next parliament. As a result of Britain's ongoing economic difficulties, some members of the Party 
expressed  concerns  that  sustaining  the  level  of  full  employment  could  prove  difficult,  if  not 
impossible, after the expiration of the Marshall Plan.38 Conservative records show the impact these 
calls for restraint had on the 1950 manifesto. The feedback David Clarke received from his fellow 
officers confirmed that the Party was moving in two directions at the same time. On the one hand it  
wanted to make positive impressions on the mass electorate by placing the topic of employment in 
front of complex economic issues, like foreign exchange, which interested only a small fraction of 
voters. On the other, it was determined not to promise something it could not deliver.39 Fears of an 
economic crisis never fully materialized in the final version of the Manifesto. Instead, the Party 
stated that it regarded full employment to be the first aim of a future Conservative Government, but 
issued  a  warning  nonetheless:  neither  the  Conservatives  nor  Labour  could  predict  what  the 
Advisory Committee on Policy see http://www.bodley.ox.ac.uk/dept/scwmss/wmss /online/modern/cpa/acp/acp.html.
36 Maudling to Clarke, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archive: shelfmark: CRD 2/48/18
37 Mr. Churchill's Declaration of Policy to the Electors 1945. For complete text visit http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/con45.htm
38In early 1950 some economists also feared that Britain's “sterling balance” debts to India and Pakistan may have formed an important and possibly  
dangerous element in the push for full employment. Sterling balances were credits in British pounds held overseas that Britain repaid in unrequited  
exports, which, by some statistics, reached 15 per cent of the country's total exports. Economists and politicians regarded this as a drain on the British 
economy. For more details visit http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/42665275.
39 Oliver Stebbings, a CRD research officer Clarke reached out to in search of feedback, also expressed concern that the cessation of, or reduction in,  
unrequited exports to other countries could have a serious effect on the level of employment, only secondary to the expiration of Marshall Aid. This,  
he  believed,  was something the  Party needed to be  prepared for.  For  more  details  see  Oxford,  Bodleian Library,  Conservative  Party Archive: 
shelfmark: CRD 2/48/18.
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consequences of the cessation of American aid would mean for the British economy and for the 
level of unemployment.40
Despite these issues the shared view of the Party was that the new, more positive version, 
including some minor  parts  that  were re-written by Churchill  himself,  was better  than Clarke's 
original draft.41
1.3 Prepared to lead
The results of the 1950 General Election were a disappointment for the Party, particularly because 
Labour's majority in Parliament was paper thin. The work that went into the Right Road all of a  
sudden seemed to be pointless, with the majority of voters still unconvinced by what Conservatives 
had to offer. Nevertheless, the experience proved far less worrisome than the one in 1945, and this 
time the wounds would heal much quicker. The fact that the Conservative policy-making machinery 
never really stopped running was good, since it would take only eighteen months before it would be 
put to the test again.
The Conservative manifestos of 1950 and 1951 were to become the foundations of future 
policy declarations, offering party administrations both a structural and organizational template for 
producing  important  publications.  Not  only  would  they  provide  the  framework  for  expressing 
political ideas, they would also show how preserving and reinvigorating old policy patterns for the 
purpose of campaigning could help achieve excellent election results (Looking Ahead, February 5th 
1962, ACP 3/8). It would prove far too ambitious at this point to recreate the period between the 
1950 and 1951 General Election and everything that occurred during that time. All that can be said 
is that the Party still continued to show organizational strains, combined with a general mood of  
anxiety.  The  Conservatives  weren't  sure  neither  of  themselves  nor  the  remedies  they  were 
defending.42 This was reflected in discussions about policies,  where the rank and file  members 
would press for a more detailed approach. The three areas that proved particularly contentious were 
denationalization, the future of Health Services and housing.43 For the first one, the consensus in the 
Party was that it  was both politically and industrially impractical,  especially in  the case of the 
energy sector. As a result, any mention of gas and electricity was omitted from the 1951 Manifesto 
altogether.44 The second area also proved difficult  to manage.  Conservatives,  even though they 
accepted the principle of the National Health Service, were convinced that the programme needed 
40 For complete text of This is the Road visit http://www.politicsresources.net/ area/uk/man/con50.htm
41 Notes on third draft of Manifesto, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archive: shelfmark:  CRD 2/48/18
42 Ramsden, John. The Making of Conservative Party Policy (London : HarperCollins, 1980): 149.
43 Ibid.: 153-154.
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to be reformed, as its cost for the country was too great. They desperately needed a line of policy 
that would be distinctive in making the NHS more efficient and would not be seen as a way of  
damaging the programme or undermining the principle of free universal access to healthcare on 
which it was based.45
The  solutions  they  provided  in  two  alternative  economic  schemes  that  would  save  the 
country between 25 and 50 million pounds per year were never included in the 1951 Manifesto.46 
All that was mentioned on the topic of Health was that the Party, if elected,  will provide better 
services and so “fulfil the high hopes we all held when we planned the improvements during the 
war”.47 The  fact  that  the  areas  of  health  and  denationalization  proved  too  contentious  or  too 
impractical  to address in the Manifesto meant  that  housing was going to be one of the central 
themes  on  the  Conservative  agenda.  Not  surprisingly,  since  it  was  announced  at  the  1950 
Conservative Conference in Blackpool that the Party, if it were elected, would build 300.000 new 
homes per year. Butler's memoirs and historical accounts written by Ramsden show how divided the 
Party was on both the political and economic implications of such a high number. Butler and most 
of his colleagues were fully conscious of the political benefits: it was no secret the idea proved 
extremely popular among the rank and file. Butler, however, feared the effect it  would have on 
Britain's  ailing  economy.  The  problem was  in  the  scarcity  of  resources,  which  meant  that  the 
expanding of the house building programme would bring higher inflation.48 Some fifteen years later 
he described his dilemma, pointing out the fact that both “/.../ the promise and the achievement were 
magnificent politically; economically, however, they placed a severe inflationary strain upon our 
resources which contributed to the difficulties of 1954-55”.49 There was no turning back at this 
point. The only thing that the Conservatives could use as insurance in case they wouldn't be able to 
promise the 300.000 target in the next Manifesto was the Rearmament Programme. Correspondence 
between  Churchill,  Party  Chairman  Lord  Woolton  and  Butler  from  February  1951  offers  an 
instructive example of how the men tried to find the appropriate line on housing in view of the 
obligations  concerning  rearmament.  The  question  that  interested  candidates  and  speakers  was 
whether they should continue to state that that the next Conservative government will  building 
300.000 houses a year? The answer that Butler provided Churchill and Woolton was based on the 
44 Ibid.: 153-154.
45Ibid.: 153-154
46 Ibid., 155-156
47 For  complete  text  of  the  1951  Conservative  Party  Manifesto  visit:  http://www.conservativemanifesto.com/1951/1951-
conservative-manifesto.shtml
48 Ramsden, John. The Age of Churchill and Eden (London etc.: Longman,1995): 157; Ibid.: 173; Butler, R.A. The Art of the Possible: The Memoirs  
of Lord Butler (London : Hamilton: 1971): 154-155.
49 Ibid, 154-155
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Leader's own speech at the Conference in Blackpool. In spite of his previous reservations, Butler 
advised that the Party should stick to the 300.000 goal, but should consider this in terms of a target 
to be reached as soon as the Rearmament Programme permits.50
For  all  intents  and  purposes  Housing  proved  to  be  the  ultimate  Conservative  pledge. 
Unaware that by the end of the year the country would be voting again, the Party embarked on a 
policy that,  according to Ramsden, “allowed both a celebration of pre-war Conservatism and a 
denunciation of Labour failures”.51 While most members could now be certain that housing would 
play an  important  role  in  the  next  Manifesto,  the  programme still  had  its  opponents,  although 
mainly from outside the Party. The Times, in a comment about Conservative policy, argued that the 
Party needed to  show that  it  could handle  the  country in  an immediate  crisis  with  “a ruthless 
reordering of the list of claims on the nation's purse, putting rearmament at the head and welfare 
including housing, far lower than most parliamentary candidates would like” (Conservative Policy, 
The  Times,  August  25th 1951).  This,  of  course,  was  never  going  to  happen.  The  Party  was 
comfortable with the progress it made, even though it meant accepting Labour's social and welfare 
reforms and the state's role in the management of the economy.52 After six long years in opposition, 
the Conservatives finally improved their image and were on course to win the unexpected election 
Attlee announced for October 25th.
The short time span between Atlee's announcement and the date the Conservative manifesto 
was to be published heavily influenced the way the document's overall appearance and way it came 
about.  The  1951  Conservative  Party  General  Election  Manifesto was  an  entirely  different 
publication from This is the Road. It was much shorter, to the point and almost all of it was written 
by Churchill. The policy basis for the document was a lengthier publication, titled Britain Strong 
and Free, which was launched by the Party only days after Churchill's signed off on his last party 
manifesto.53 While the tone of both documents was more libertarian, the policies, with the notable 
exception  of  housing  and  its  ambitious  target,  remained  similar  to  those  used  in  the  previous 
Manifesto  and  the  Right  Road  for  Britain.  The  Times,  observant  of  the  similarities  and  the 
vagueness of the Conservative approach, commented “that the impression which all of this leaves is 
that the manifesto has been deliberately designed to cause the least offense possible – even at the 
50 Butler to Churchill and Woolton, Cambridge, Churchill Archive Centre: shelfmark: CHUR 2/105; Woolton to the Leader of the Party, Cambridge, 
Churchill Archive Centre: shelfmark: CHUR 2/105; Churchill to Chairman of the Party,  Cambridge, Churchill Archive Centre: shelfmark:  CHUR 
2/105
51 Ramsden, John. The Age of Churchill and Eden (London etc.: Longman,1995): 172.
52 Ibid.: 174.
53 Ramsden, John. The Making of Conservative Party Policy (London : HarperCollins, 1980): 161.
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cost  of  diminishing  its  cogency”,54 indicating  the  Party was  making the  same mistakes  as  the 
previous  year.  This  time,  however,  the  Conservatives  would  be  rewarded  for  their  cautious 
approach.
  
2. From government to opposition in the 1960s
2.1 The leaders
The period between 1955 and 1970 represented a  much more  turbulent  endeavour  in  terms  of 
organizational stability than the first  ten years after  the war.  In 1957, after  two years in office, 
Anthony Eden stepped down as Prime Minister and as Leader of the Conservative Party, and was 
replaced by Harold Macmillan. Despite Macmillan's six consecutive years in office, this was the 
first  of three major leadership changes the Conservatives experienced in the thirteen years that 
followed.  The  effect  these  changes  had  on  policy  priorities  is  generally  well  researched,  with 
authors such as Lindsay and Harrington, Barnes and Cockett, and Charmley addressing some of the 
main developments.
General election manifestos, like other Conservative policy statements published during this 
period, were products of careful considerations, although many concerns of the past, like the fear of 
defying  policy  seemed  to  have  vanished  with  Churchill's  departure.  This  chapter  shows  some 
particularities that evolved in the process of drafting these documents, especially after the 1964 
Election which set of a chain of reforms to the Conservative organization. It starts of, however, with 
a  general  look at  how the policy process  was organized under  four very different  leaders.  For 
various reasons, the impact these men had on Conservative policy making between 1955 and 1970 
was much more obvious than in previous years. The examples discussed here generally confirm 
Barnes & Cockett's notion that the leader's role remained pre-eminent, compared to policy decisions 
made by other individuals within the Party, and that final decisions were usually made on a political 
rather than an ideological basis.1
Policy making was still very much influenced by the personality of the individual that held 
the top position. In retrospect, Harold Macmillan and Edward Heath stand out as the most policy-
54 Conservative Policy, The Times, September 29th 1951.
1Barnes, John and Richard Cockett. The Making of Party Policy, in Conservative Century: Conservative Party since 1900, ed. Anthony Seldon, and 
Stuart Ball (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994): 382.
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oriented Leaders of the era, with the strength to mobilize the resources of their role effectively and 
to the benefit of the entire party. The men they replaced at the top of the organizational structure 
showed there was nothing self-evident about their abilities. In terms of electoral stability, Eden's 
mistakes were largely reverted, thanks to Macmillan's decision to postpone the next general election 
until 1959, which gave the Party enough time to regenerate. For Alec Douglas-Home, his successor, 
the election 1964, on the contrary, came too quickly.
The way contemporaries saw these men helps researchers better understand the qualities of 
their political style and the differences that set them apart. Anthony Eden, who took over the Party 
from Churchill in 1955, came to represent perhaps the poorest example of executive power, both in 
terms of managing the country and the Conservative rank and file. Most notable for his role as 
Foreign Secretary,  Eden enjoyed an unblemished reputation among the electorate.  His  polished 
appearance  and  behaviour,  however,  concealed  his  lack  of  experience  on  the  domestic  and 
economic front. From a policy-making perspective, Eden's style of leadership became similar to 
Churchill's but for all the wrong reasons. To demonstrate he had control, he became obsessed with 
detail, keeping his ministers under constant pressure, which only enhanced his inability to cultivate 
a wide range of support within the Party, where a number of key people, including Rab Butler, who 
served as the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Harold Macmillan, who was destined to become 
Eden's eventual replacement, had doubts he was capable of performing his duties to the standard set 
by his predecessor. Eden's reputation for indecision was perhaps the most troubling factor of all.2
Macmillan, by contrast, came to view policy making as a source of great enjoyment that 
allowed him to engage with ideas and arguments, particularly on issues related to the economy. His 
political career spread through decades, and much of what he experienced in his earlier years would 
influence the decisions he made later in life.3 His conservatism was essentially a manifestation of 
the  post-war  consensus,  a  compromise  between  the  ideas  of  interventionism  and  free-market 
capitalism. Macmillan's time in office is well documented and researched, especially in terms of his 
policy making. Ramsden's detailed account of the way Eden's successor conducted his tasks and 
organized  the  Party  shows  a  man  in  control:  the  scale  of  organizational  change  Macmillan 
undertook became representative of his style and approach to politics. The effect this had on the 
Conservative machinery was unprecedented in the history of the Party. The relationships the Prime 
Minister  maintained  with  his  Cabinet  colleagues  and  intra-party  structures,  such  as  the  CRD, 
allowed the Conservatives to undergo a transformation that would consolidate all their assets and 
allow the Party to recover  from the disappointments of the previous couple of years under the 
2 Charmley, John. A History of Conservative Politics, 1900-1996 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996): 152-153.
3 Green, E.H.H. Ideologies of Conservatism: Conservative Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century (Oxford etc : Oxford University Press, 2002).157-
160.
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leadership of Macmillan's predecessor.4
With regard to the changes in electoral strategy and the way policy was communicated to the 
electorate, the Conservative Party from 1955 onwards seemingly experienced far less contentious 
dilemmas than during the first decade after the War. Despite many differences in their approach to 
policy-making, no administration wanted to revisit the days when policy was something to hide. 
Even after they re-entered opposition, the Conservatives tried to follow an open and transparent 
approach. In some instances, the solutions they were proposing came very close to what the other 
side was prepared to offer. By the end of the decade, their positions on key issues remained vague, 
mostly because they feared that the alternative would cause disunity among Conservative ranks.5
The manifesto continued to play the role of the Party's central policy declaration, while its 
other attributes became more apparent, particularly in situations that tested the resilience of the 
Leaders and the Cabinet. In the end of the 1950s, the Party had to find a way to deal with not only 
the economic but the political fallout of the Suez crisis. Eden's failure to restore control over the 
newly nationalized Egyptian canal using military force exposed his Government to criticism for its  
geostrategic short-sightedness. The fact that the failure wasn't military but political, brought about 
by American insistence that a final solution to the conflict be found in the United Nations, was later  
seen as a humiliating blow to the country's  reputation for which Eden would have to carry the  
blame. The crisis  reached its  peak less than a year after  the Conservatives wrote in their  1955 
General Election Manifesto that the last government had successfully restored the country's prestige 
in the Middle East. Even though the reality on the ground at that time largely supported this view, 
the Government and the Prime Minister could now be seen as losing control over a significant part  
of their foreign policy.6 The alternative, however, was even less appealing. Britain was on the verge 
of  another  economic  crisis,  with the pound sterling suffering  from heavy selling.  The US was 
willing to offer assistance in reversing the fall of the currency, but only if Britain agreed to find a 
diplomatic solution for the conflict.7 The Government now needed to choose between fulfilling one 
foreign policy objective and protecting the stability of the British economy. Pride and humiliation 
aside, the choice was easy to make.
 Unlike Eden, who was keen to use his predecessor's record to his own advantage, people 
like Rab Butler understood how risky it was for the Party to speak in definitive terms about things it 
4 Clarke, Peter. Hope and Glory: Britain 1900-1990 (London: Allen Lane/Penguin Press, 1996): 24-28; Ramsden, John. The Making of Conservative  
Party Policy (London : HarperCollins, 1980): 190-192.
5 Burch, Martin. Approaches to Leadership in Opposition: Edward Heath and Margaret Thatcher, in  Conservative Party Politics, ed. Zig  Layton-
Henry (London: Macmillan, 1980): 168. 
6 Lindsay, T.F and Michael Harrington. The Conservative Party 1918-1970 (London etc. : Macmillan, 1974): 192.
7 Heath, Edward. The Course of My Life (London : Hodder & Stoughton, 1998):174.
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had very little control of, i.e. issues surrounding war and peace. Even before the 1955 election, 
when the Conservatives were preparing their programme, there was significant concern that too 
much optimism, particularly in the area foreign policy, could cause trouble for a future Conservative 
government somewhere down the road. Butler, years later, recalled how a change in fortune was 
predicted by those who participated in the drafting of the 1955 manifesto:
/../ it was a fact that, for the first time since the War, no actual fighting was taking 
place anywhere in the world. The Prime Minister understandably proposed that  
this should be recorded in print, and Lord Woolton and I were deputed by our  
cautious and hard-headed colleagues to dissuade him from this  course on the  
grounds that the fact could well be falsified before the ink was dry on paper.8 
The Prime Minister, indeed, seemed to forget how important it was not to generalize on vital issues.  
Eden's optimism over peace, as the events of 1956 would show, didn't last long. The same was true 
for  his  successor,  who was quick to  realize the mistake he had made in  believing the military 
operation in Egypt would be a success.9
In 1957, Macmillan introduced new party structures (and reinvigorated some old ones) that 
complemented existing agencies in their policy work, like the Steering Committee, which had the 
task of directing policy in a coherent manner, and the Liaison Committee, which tried to identify 
problems in policy ideas before they became apparent.  In the end of the 1950s, the challenges 
brought about by modern communication were becoming increasingly harder to control. With the 
help of the Liaison Committee, the Party wanted to improve organizational issues, from timing in 
the execution of policy to the way it was communicating Conservative ideas to wider audiences. 
Through policy mechanisms, such as  'Weekend Talking Points' that outlined the most important 
topics of the week, the Committee helped the Party keep its various voices coherent,10 and over time 
managed to  significantly improve its public image.
By  far  the  most  important  piece  of  political  propaganda  Macmillan  and  his  Cabinet 
produced was the 1959 Conservative Manifesto, The Next Five Years. Compared to the last election, 
the  stakes  were  higher,  even  though  the  Party  seemed  to  have  recovered  electorally  from the 
disaster at  Suez.  Not surprisingly,  the events of 1956 were still  on everybody's  mind when the 
manifesto was being prepared, even though the international climate at this point looked like it 
wouldn't have much influence on the course of the campaign. The Party, however, still needed to be 
cautious about any eventuality. For a while the Government even contemplated raising the issue of 
8 Butler, R.A. The Art of the Possible: The Memoirs of Lord Butler (London : Hamilton: 1971):184.
9 Lindsay, T.F and Michael Harrington. The Conservative Party 1918-1970 (London etc. : Macmillan, 1974):192.
10 Ramsden, John. The Making of Conservative Party Policy (London : HarperCollins, 1980): 193-194.
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Suez  itself  before  the  Opposition  could  transform it  into  a  serious  election  problem.11 Such a 
strategy, despite the fact that it never came to fruition, demonstrated that propaganda was never the 
Government's  sole  purpose  for  writing  the  1959  Manifesto.  Instead,  the  publication,  read  by 
millions of voters, could be used for purely tactical reasons, to defend one's performance in office 
while at the same time discourage the opponent from bringing a problem or a controversial issue to 
light. With the help of their election manifesto the Conservatives could force an issue out in the 
open simply because it was the most politically sensible thing to do. By mentioning Suez, they 
would look like they were in control of their destiny, ready to talk about even the most controversial 
and potentially damaging topics. By using an open and straightforward approach, the Conservatives 
could effectively disarm their opponents of any munition that would target either their record or 
credibility. Lord Hailsham, who served as Party Chairman during Macmillan's six years in office,  
recalled  the  Prime  Minister's  personal  motto,  which  also  perfectly  described  the  Conservative 
election strategy: “Play it long; play it down; play it slow”.12 It summarized the steady and above all 
safe approach to the way the Party was communicating its intentions and engaging with rivals.
By 1963, when Macmillan resigned from his position, the Conservative Party was no longer 
considered the  face of  modernity.  It  was  losing the  battle  for  the  future,  which  was becoming 
increasingly associated with Labour. With their controversial choice for Macmillan's replacement, 
the  Conservatives  forced  this  perception  even further.  Alec  Douglas-Home,  who took over  the 
Party in 1963, was not particularly interested in being personally involved in formulating policy, 
and believed that the essence of Conservatism was 'doing the right thing at the right time'.13  He 
seemed hardly the person to modernize Britain, especially when compared to Harold Wilson, his 
younger Labour rival. By selecting an old aristocrat-type diplomat to replace Macmillan, the Party 
was looking like it was determined to return to some of the certainties of the past to overcome the  
unpleasantness of the present.14
Nevertheless,  the  new  Prime  Minister  showed  great  capacity  for  effectively  using  the 
organizational structure and policy-making framework that Macmillan and the previous Cabinet set 
in place. When Douglas-Home became Leader of the Opposition after the Party suffered its first 
election defeat  in  almost  fourteen years,  he  veered  towards  the establishment  of  an alternative 
government, with a substantial alternative programme. He asked Edward 'Ted' Heath, the future 
11 Ibid.: 197.
12 Hailsham, Lord. A Sparrow's Flight: The Memoirs of Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone (London: HarperCollins, 1990): 323.  
13 Hill, Michael. Alec Douglas-Home, 1964-5, in Leaders of the Opposition: From Churhchill to Cameron, ed. Timothy Heppell (Basingstoke etc. : 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012): 72.
14 Blake,  Robert.  The  Conservative  Party  from  Peel  to  Thatcher  (London:  Methuen,  1985):  293-294;  Norton,  Philip  and  Arthur  Aughey. 
Conservatives and Conservatism (London : Temple Smith,1981): 143.
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Prime Minister who was serving as chairman of the ACP at that time, to set in motion a review of 
policy and prepare prescriptions to prevent the Party from being caught of guard in case of a snap 
election.15 Compared to the period of 1945-1951, the Conservative policy exercise proved more 
complex, with 30 or more groups trying to find answers to very specific questions. Some of the  
recommendations  they  provided  were  so  detailed,  they  could  serve  as  blueprints  for  a  future 
Conservative government. In his autobiography, Heath notably pointed out that the policy review he 
initiated and coordinated was the biggest since the work Rab Butler had done under Churchill in the 
late 1940s.16
The process continued throughout the end of the 1960s and well into the next decade, long 
after Douglas-Home stepped down as Leader of the Party. The first fruit of the policy rethink was a 
document  called  Putting  Britain  Right  Ahead,  which  would  serve  as  the  basis  for  the  1966 
Conservative General Election manifesto. The publication, subtitled 'A Statement of Conservative 
Aims', would in many ways define the new Leader's policy priorities for at least the next five years.  
Writing in his autobiography, Heath emphasized the importance of Putting Britain Right Ahead, 
both in terms of preparing the Party for a possible general election and outlining its course for the 
future:
The immediate priority of my team was to get our ideas ready for a publication 
called Putting Britain Right Ahead in time for the 1965 Party Conference /.../.  
This document  set  the tone of party policy throughout my years as leader.  It  
began with a statement of principles, declaring that 'the State should serve the  
people, not dominate them'.17
Whether the publication constituted an example of ideological posturing is open to interpretation. 
The  fact  that  the  document  continued  to  be  the  predominant  charter  of  Conservative  political 
priorities  long after  the 1966 election suggests  the Party and the Leader  had a  high degree of 
confidence in the principles they declared. For Heath, this represented a way of controlling and, 
above all, limiting the amount of discussions about the fundamentals of party belief. Debates on the 
nature of Conservatism could lead to disunity among Tory peers, something he feared a party in 
opposition simply could not afford. Heath therefore tried to limit discussions on certain key issues, 
particularly in the economic sphere. As a result of this, some policy positions became increasingly 
15 Burch, Martin. Approaches to Leadership in Opposition: Edward Heath and Margaret Thatcher, i n Conservative Party Politics, ed. Zig Layton-
Henry (London: Macmillan, 1980): 164; Hill, Michael. Alec Douglas-Home, 1964-5, in Leaders of the Opposition: From Churhchill to Cameron, ed. 
Timothy Heppell (Basingstoke etc. : Palgrave Macmillan, 2012): 73.
16 Heath, Edward. The Course of My Life (London : Hodder & Stoughton, 1998): 267.
17 Ibid.: 275.
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vague and ambiguous.18
2.2 Declaring policy, moving forward
The Conservative manifestos of 1955, 1959 and 1964 all needed to overcome one specific burden: 
their  role  was limited by the  fact  that  the party issuing them had to defend its  own record in 
government. Like any political party that won two or more consecutive elections, the longer the 
Conservatives remained in control of the country the more difficult it was for them to develop new 
policies without appearing exhausted and drained of ideas. In terms of continuing the policy pattern 
established  in  the  beginning  of  the  decade,  both  the  1955  and  1959  Conservative  campaigns 
followed a predetermined election formula. By the mid-1960s, however, the Party's earlier electoral 
successes proved impossible to repeat.
Eden's and Macmillan's general election manifestos were both published during a time when 
economic  prosperity  and  a  period  of  international  stability  coincided  and  created  a  general 
atmosphere of hope. With a solid record in office and strong leaders in place, the Party had all the 
necessary ingredients for conducting convincing and ultimately successful campaigns.
In 1959, the Conservatives outlined their manifesto with two questions: 'Do you want to go 
ahead on the lines which have brought prosperity at home? Do you want your present leaders to 
represent you abroad?' The party that had been in power for eight years, and was now trying to 
secure its third election win, wanted to seem convincing. It was clear, that abrupt change in course 
would seem like an admission of failure – like the Government had nothing left to offer. Therefore, 
the  Conservatives  needed to  promise more  of  the same prosperity and hope.19 In  essence,  this 
represented the same approach the Conservatives used in their 1955 Manifesto, called  United for  
Peace and Progress, where voters were encouraged to compare the difficult life under Labour with 
prosperity during the last Tory government and ask themselves, which was better for their families 
and their country. The five years Labour spent in government could hardly compare with the higher 
standard of living and the preservation of peace the Conservatives had to show for in the 1951-55 
period.  Four years later,  the situation proved very similar.  Particularly on the domestic front,  a 
relatively  steady  cost  of  living,  full  employment  and  rising  incomes  gave  the  Conservatives 
confidence that their position should continue to improve in the months and years ahead. Labour, 
understandably, tried to attack the Government's record by bringing more contentious issues like 
18 Burch, Martin. Approaches to Leadership in Opposition: Edward Heath and Margaret Thatcher, i n Conservative Party Politics, ed. Zig Layton-
Henry (London: Macmillan, 1980): 186-187.
19 Lindsay, T.F and Michael Harrington. The Conservative Party 1918-1970 (London etc. : Macmillan, 1974): 207; For the entire text of the 1955 
Conservative Party Manifesto visit http://www.conservativemanifesto.com/1955/1955-conservative-manifesto.shtml.
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Suez to the front of the nation debate.20 But none of it seemed to work.
Both the 1955 and 1959 Manifesto were labelled by researches as rather unexciting, slightly 
ponderous documents that highlighted all the achievements of the Government that was about to 
conclude its work, but made hardly any new pledges besides the obvious one – the reaffirmation of 
the status quo.21 The first drafts for the 1955 document were prepared by Martin Fraser of the CRD 
and Peter Goldman, the Director of Conservative Political Centre who also the author of the original 
draft for the 1959 manifesto. United for Peace and Progress, in which Eden took a great interest,  
was published in April 1955, well before any of the opposition parties could do the same. In fact, it  
took a little over a month for the drafting process to be completed, which was record time compared 
to similar policy declarations published in the past. The Next Five Years, by contrast,  took five 
months to finish. The content of the document and its implications was discussed many times by the 
Steering Committee,  where the Prime Minister, Rab Butler, Lord Hailsham in the role of Party 
Chairman, and other members of the Cabinet tried to devise new ways to present policy, which 
would make the Manifesto seem more original than it actually was. The electorate needed to be 
convinced that the Party was moving forward, which is why great care was taken to present voters 
with a clear choice between moderate change under Macmillan and radical change under Labour.22
To some extent, this dilemma represented the sort of situation that occurred in the middle of 
every  parliamentary  term,  when  the  policy  effects  of  the  last  election  begin  to  fade  and  the 
government starts searching for a new voice. Conservative Party records, published after the 1959 
election,  confirm that  Macmillan's  task  represented  nothing  out  of  the  ordinary.  Preserving  or 
reinvigorating old policies for the purpose of campaigning was considered routine and an example 
of smart decision making. In a paper distributed by the CRD, Michael Fraser explained that in order 
to be effective, a party needs to represent real interests and have relevant ideas. When these become 
dated or start to fade, the party needs to put forward new policies.23 
In 1959 neither Labour nor the Liberals posed a serious threat to the Government, simply 
because their  proposals were either out-of-date or completely non-existent.  Five years later,  the 
situation proved different. Macmillan's departure and the rise of Alec Douglas-Home did not result 
in any substantial policy rethink, at least not until after the votes were cast and the election lost. The 
Conservative Party became a victim of its own success: much like in 1955 and 1959, the Tories 
20 Ramsden, John. The Age of Churchill and Eden (London etc.: Longman,1995): 276-277; LLindsay, T.F and Michael Harrington. The Conservative  
Party 1918-1970 (London etc. : Macmillan, 1974): 207.
21 Butler, David and Richard Rose. The British General Election of 1959 (London: Macmillan,1960): 49; Ramsden, John. The Age of Churchill and  
Eden (London etc.: Longman,1995): 276.
22 Ramsden, John. The Making of Conservative Party Policy (London : HarperCollins, 1980): 203.
23 Looking Ahead, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archive: shelfmark:  ACP 3/8.
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were doubtful about introducing new policies that would cause the status quo to collapse or that 
could antagonize a certain part of the electorate. Ramsden wrote that this was the result of the long 
gestation period of the Manifesto, which “was marked by a series of radical departures that were 
discarded  one  by  one.”  New  ideas  and  policies  that  would  make  it  look  less  vague  were 
systematically scaled down, to the point where some members began to wonder who exactly was 
the manifesto aimed at.24
Contrary to  Ramsden's  account,  Conservative  records  show how the  lack  of  substantial 
policy initiatives was a conscious and deliberate decision on the part of the people that prepared the 
document:  the Party wanted to move away from subjects of particular interest  towards broader 
questions of state. The outline of the 1964 Manifesto, distributed by the Advisory Committee on 
Policy,  proposed  that  the  focus  of  the  Party's  campaign  should  move  away from policies  like 
Housing and Education, to more general themes of economic growth and international relations.25 
Meanwhile, long-term policies associated with the post-war consensus would largely remain intact. 
Like in 1955 and 1959, the pledge for full-employment was featured prominently in the Party's 
programme,  which  beard  the  title  Prosperity  with  a  Purpose.  Even  though  the  Conservatives 
acknowledged that  a  growing economy must  remain  flexible  in  order  to  anticipate  changes  in 
markets, methods and machines, they were determined to show that the interest of industry workers 
“must be fully safeguarded in the process”.26
If the choice between Conservative, Labour and Liberal seemed clear in 1959, on the eve of 
the 1964 General Election the opposite was certainly true. Labour published its manifesto, The New 
Britain,  one  week  before  the  Conservatives  released  their  own document.  The  Prime  Minister 
quickly went before the press to accuse Labour of putting forward “a menu without prices”, saying 
that the most absolute difference between the parties “is that every item in this programme has been 
costed.”  This,  however,  could  hardly  hide  or  change  the  fact  that  the  Conservatives  were 
campaigning on the exact same themes of prosperity, modernization and peace that formed the base 
of Labour's election pledge.27
The rise of Ted Heath soon put an end to the dominance of abstract conceptions that formed 
the core of Conservative policy. In retrospect, the episode of 1964 had wide-ranging implications 
for Conservative priorities. They will be discussed in detail in the last part of this chapter, along 
24 Ramsden, John. The Making of Conservative Party Policy (London : HarperCollins, 1980): 228-229.
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with  other  changes  to  the  function  of  the  Conservative  manifesto  that  have  previously  gone 
unnoticed.  Heath,  indeed,  was  the  exception  among  Conservative  leaders  when  it  came  to 
expressing specific commitments and pledges. His emphasis on policy work in opposition reflected 
a view that the Party should be prepared for office even if an election is not imminent.28 The 1966 
Manifesto,  Action  Not  Words,  which  was  heavily  based  on  the  1965  policy  statement  Putting 
Britain Right Ahead, was a telling example of just how far the Party had come after less than two 
years in opposition.
The Conservatives now seemed solely concentrated on practical proposals. The search for 
ideas was widespread, and involved gathering examples from Britain as well as other countries. 
Officers of the Research Department circled the world in hope of finding solutions for problems the 
country was experiencing. The Party,  above all,  wanted to show that other nations were facing 
similar hard choices with regard to industrial relations, taxation, technology, government operating 
costs,  education etc.29 Historians would later point out that the policy exercise of 1964-70 was 
arranged in  direct  contrast  to  previous  years,  when themes  were  conceived prior  to  the  actual 
proposals. This time around, the Leader and the Shadow Cabinet endorsed a bottom up approach, 
believing that themes could also emerge from specific ideas.30
Of course, all eyes were focused on achieving as much distinction between the opposing 
sides as possible. Correspondence between David Howell, who prepared the original draft of the 
Manifesto, and other members of the Research Department from February 1965, include references 
about  the  difficulties  of  defying  a  “distinctive  philosophical  approach”  or,  in  other  words,  a 
narrative. The debate around this issue, unfortunately, did not stay confined to inner party circles. In 
an  outspoken  article  published  by the  Spectator,  Angus  Maude,  a  Front  Bench  spokesman  on 
colonial affairs, complained how the Party had become “a meaningless irrelevance”, pointing out 
that it had produced no strong alternative with regard to trade unions, high personal taxation, and 
radical changes in welfare services. Maude was convinced the new technocratic approach to solving 
issues  would  only  hurt  the  Conservatives  in  the  end  (Campbell  1993,  206).  Afterwards,  some 
members of the Research Department conceded that the Party had, indeed, been too focused on 
technical exercises instead of presenting priorities in a more comprehensive manor.31
With  its  131  pledges  the  Manifesto  was  perceived  as  one  of  the  most  detailed  policy 
statements ever published by the Conservatives. But even that couldn't help the Party garner the 
28Garnett, Mark. Edward Heath, 1965-70 and 1974-75. in Leaders of the Opposition: From Churhchill to Cameron, ed. Timothy Heppell 
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29 Together We Can Do It,  Oxford, Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archive: shelfmark: CRD 3/9/32,36
30 Ramsden, John. The Making of Conservative Party Policy (London : HarperCollins, 1980): 241.
31 Howell to Fraser, Sewill to Fraser, January 1966, CRD 3/9/32,36
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votes it needed; in fact, the result of the election was an even larger Labour majority. Heath's plan 
had  backfired.  Action  Not  Words  was  unconvincing,  not  because  it  did  not  have  enough 
commitments, but because these had no common denominator, no common theme – precisely what 
Maude had warned about.  In the words of Ian Macleod,  “the net result  of all  of this  was that 
everybody thought we had no policy”.32
Most of the Conservative campaign revolved around Heath,  who had only been elected 
Leader  one  month  prior  to  the  Election.  According  to  Heath's  biographer,  the  1966 document 
expressed  the  Leaders  “impatient,  unreflective  style”.33 Paradoxically,  Action  Not  Words  was 
perhaps the most personal manifesto published by the Party since 1945. Closely based on Putting 
Britain Right Ahead, which remained the most important Conservative publication in second half of 
1960s, it came across as a declaration of principles, firmly held by the man who would lead the 
Conservatives for the next eight years.
2.3 Tasks of Opposition
Conservative  General  Election  manifestos  published  during  the  late  1950s  and  in  the  1960s, 
remained  products  of  careful  calculations,  drawing  attention  from virtually  all  sections  of  the 
Party,34 which confirms the centrality of these documents in the process of Conservative policy 
making.  Compared  to  previous  publications,  they  remained  centred  around  general  principles 
established under the last Churchill government: in this sense, they were used for both promotional 
and policy purposes. Drawing on the manifesto's promotional attributes, Conservatives used these 
documents to establish direct contact with the electorate. At the same time, the manifesto and the 
way it came to life served as as a powerful method of selection. With its help the Party could 
instantly decide which policy priorities deserved to stay and which needed to go.  
An example of the latter can be found in Ted Heath's 1966 Manifesto, which, for the first 
time in sixteen years, gave no mention of full employment. The fact that only two years prior to 
that, Alec Douglas-Home signed of on his own Government's manifesto where the long-standing 
policy was featured prominently among a wide selection of pledges, reveals just how much effect 
32 Burch, Martin. Approaches to Leadership in Opposition: Edward Heath and Margaret Thatcher, i n Conservative Party Politics, ed. Zig Layton-
Henry (London: Macmillan, 1980):168-169; Davies, A.J. We, the Nation. The Conservative Party and the Pursuit of Power (London: Little, Brown & 
Co. 1995): 199;  Garnett, Mark. Edward Heath, 1965-70 and 1974-75. in  Leaders of the Opposition: From Churhchill to Cameron, ed. Timothy 
Heppell (Basingstoke etc. : Palgrave Macmillan, 2012): 85.
33 Campbell, John. Edward Heath: A Biography (London: Cape, 1993): 208.
34 This was particularly true in the initial stages of the process, when the CRD was receiving letters upon letters of policy proposals, written by  
various party officials and Conservative MPs. In most cases these letters were responses to initiatives made by the representatives of the CRD who  
encouraged Party members to share their opinions either on the general appearance of the manifesto or specific topics that they were associated with.
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the 1964 General Election had on Conservative priorities. The Research Department's records show 
how the Party for long considered unemployment as the greatest threat to its electoral prospects. 
Wherever small clusters of unemployment appeared or were about to appear, the Party felt it had to 
deal with the problem head on.35
In 1966, however, the Conservatives pledged to create new jobs, but not to preserve old 
ones.  The  preliminary  focus  of  the  Manifesto  was  on  transforming  Britain  into  a  high-wage 
economy. Unemployment was only mentioned in the context of regional development, like in the 
case of Northern Ireland, where the Party wanted to offer inducements to new industry in order to 
raise the number of people working.  Unlike 1964, there were also no references to the importance 
of maintaining high employment in the context of industrial relations, where the Tories hoped that 
targeted measures, such as benefits and compensations for redundant workers, would in the end 
help reduce the number of industrial disputes.36
When a piece of policy disappeared from an election programme, it did not necessarily mean 
it was dead. As the next chapter will show, the pledge for full employment eventually resurfaced in 
the manifesto of 1970, where it was used to attack the Labour Government for its failed economic 
record, and to remind voters of the Conservative years of rising prosperity. Even though they failed 
to mention one of the predominant Conservative policies of the post-war period, the authors of the 
1966 Manifesto had a tendency not to cause controversy. Much like Ted Heath, who for the sake of 
preserving  unity  among  the  Conservative  rank  and  file  avoided  dragging  the  Party  in  a  long 
discussion about the essence of Conservatism, Action Not Words could be seen as reaffirmation of 
his steady approach to leadership.37 In the words of Margaret Thatcher, the document “accurately 
summed up Ted's impact on politics”.38 The way it gestated, the way it was written and presented 
symbolized the leader's character, political style and conviction to a degree not witnessed since the 
days of Churchill.
The period which is the focus of this chapter also brings to light another function of the 
Conservative  manifesto,  related  to  the  issue  of  party  coordination.  Correspondence  between 
members of the Research Department shows how important it was for candidates, who represented 
and spoke on behalf of the Party at various events and gatherings, to have access to a coherent set of 
policy priorities. For instance, during the 1959 election campaign the Party's candidates particularly 
appreciated  the  simple,  constructive  and  concise  nature  of  the  document,  the  fact  that  it  was 
35 Reflections on the 1959 General Election campaign, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archive: shelfmark:ACP 3/6,8.
36 For full texts of 1964 and 1966 Conservative General Election Manifestos visit http://www.conservativemanifesto.com/
37 Davies, A.J. We, the Nation. The Conservative Party and the Pursuit of Power (London: Little, Brown & Co. 1995): 199.
38 Thatcher, Margaret. The Path to Power (London: HarperCollins 1993): 137
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published well ahead of rival declarations, and that they could use it in their individual election 
addresses.39 Comments made by candidates imply that one of the functions of 1959 Manifesto was 
to provide Conservative members with a coherent voice. This development could very well be seen 
as a consequence of Macmillan's organizational changes, most notably represented in the 'Weekend 
talking points', which played a similarly important role in the Party's day-to-day operations.  
The experience of 1959, unlike that of 1964 or 1966, when the Conservative suffered from 
electoral  defeats,  was for  the most  part  positive.  Like  every post-election period,  the Research 
Department circulated a list of general reflections about the campaign. The CRD confirmed that 
despite a strong start by Labour, the arguments for retaining the status quo (and a Conservative 
government)  still  remained  convincing.  Combined  with  confidence  in  the  Prime  Minister's 
leadership, the general atmosphere of hope strongly favoured the continuation of existing policies, 
while Labour's  inability to provide any real alternative also improved the Government's  overall 
standing. Perhaps the most interesting reflection of all was when Michael Fraser wrote how the 
electoral battle underlined the fact that elections are never won during the official campaign, but 
prior to that,  concluding that the election campaign had almost no effect on the Party's  overall 
performance.40
Fraser's  conclusion  brings  up  an  interesting  point  about  the  promotional  function  of 
manifestos  and other  important  policy statements,  which also arises  in  Party records  published 
during later periods. In Autumn 1965, almost a year after the first Tory election defeat in more than 
a  decade,  when  the  Party was  about  to  start  preparations  on  its  next  manifesto,  the  Research 
Department published a paper in which it insisted that the  Industrial Charter, and similar policy 
statements, had very little effect on the mass electorate. What the Charter did do, however, was 
convince the “informed opinion” that the Conservative Party had envisioned and devised a viable 
economic policy contrary to that of the pre-war period. Now that the Party was in opposition, it  
needed to achieve a similar result. Its tasks were to determine what caused dissatisfaction among the 
electorate,  and  offer  a  credible  alternative  to  the  solutions  represented  by  the  Government. 
Conservative researchers were convinced there existed a correlation between alternatives, set out by 
the Opposition, and people's dissatisfaction.  The more convincing was the alternative,  the more 
dissatisfied voters became.41 In 1965, the problems identified using data from public opinion polls 
were rising prices, the high price of housing, strikes and the behaviour of trade unions, traffic jams, 
the plight of old people, the inefficiencies in the organization of national life, and, not surprisingly, 
39 General Reflections on the 1959 General Election Campaign, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archive: shelfmark: ACP 3/6,8
40 Ibid.
41 The Task of Opposition, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archive: shelfmark: CRD 3/9/32,36
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politicians.42 To have a fighting chance, the Party needed to come up with viable solutions for all of  
these issues, with the possible exception of the last one.
The episodes of 1959 and 1964 had wide-ranging implications for Conservative priorities. 
When it came to the role of the manifesto, the Party used it to fulfil tasks that far exceeded its 
original  purpose.  From sending out  a  message  to  delivering  an  attack;  from hiding  behind  its  
previous achievements, to speaking with a single and convincing voice. Even before the Party re-
entered the ranks of opposition, and set its mind on changing the way it wanted to be perceived by 
the country, the Conservative manifesto was beginning to take on a life of its own.
3. Second thoughts: Heath, Thatcher and the Party
3.1 Party in transition
Historians generally disagree about Heath's role in the disintegration of the post-war consensus. 
Some see him not only as the political but also the ideological predecessor of Margaret Thatcher, a  
'proto-Thatcherite' who anticipated her brand of Conservatism at least during the first years of his 
government, leading up to what would later be known as his U-turn1. Others stress Heath's overall 
aim was to improve the post-war consensus and not to destroy it.  During his time in office he 
adhered to full  employment and the general concept of the welfare state,  but at  the same time 
rejected the idea of partnership with the trade unions2. Even though writers may not agree about 
Heath's ideological disposition, one thing is for certain: in the 1970s, the Conservatives set out to 
redefine the role of the State under two leaders from similar ideological backgrounds but with very 
different solutions for Britain's political, social and above all economic problems. This final chapter 
examines how changes in Conservative policy priorities during the 1970s influenced the objectives 
and functions attributed to the Party's general election manifesto by earlier administrations. To get a 
definitive answer, the first part of the chapter follows the structure of the previous two, and looks at 
how  the  Party's  organization  and  approach  to  policy  making  were  reflected  in  the  way  the 
Conservative manifestos of the 1970s came to life.
42 Ibid.
1 Charmley, John. A History of Conservative Politics, 1900-1996 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996): 182-183
2 Seldon, Anthony.  Conservative Century in  Conservative Century: Conservative Party since 1900, ed. Anthony Seldon, and Stuart Ball (Oxford: 
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In stark  contrast  to  the  periods  1945-1955 and 1955-1970,  Heath  and Thatcher  became 
leaders during a time when Conservatives served in opposition. As a consequence both of them 
suffered similar handicaps: from the very start neither seemed to possess sufficient authority to 
impose  their  will  on  the  Party and,  in  one  form or  another,  both  had  to  fight  dissent  among 
Conservative ranks, whether it came from Shadow Cabinet members or MPs who thought either of 
them was not fit to perform their tasks.3 Conservative factionalism which was rising ever since 
Heath took office gave a general sense that the degree of unity attributed to the Party in the past had 
been overstated. To some extent it exposed the double-life that previous administrations were trying 
to hide by making it harder for individual voices to penetrate through the party structure to the 
outside. What is interesting is that the majority of these intra party disputes were not targeted at any 
individual,  but  were  predominantly  aimed  at  providing  an  alternative  platform for  discussions 
concerning the direction of the Party.4
When Heath, who was the second longest running Conservative Leader of the Opposition of 
the 20th century, finally arrived at 10 Downing Street he was already known as the 'Selsdon man', in  
reference to a 1970 pre-election meeting he and his Shadow Cabinet held at the Selsdon Park Hotel 
in the outskirts of London. The meeting, which presented nothing more than a discussion about 
Conservative priorities in the next election, was recognized instantly by the press for the impact it 
would have on the British political landscape. The group of people who were meeting in a southern 
suburb of London, as the Times observed, were likely to be the next government. When the dust  
settled, the priorities of the future Cabinet became more apparent. The newspaper commented that 
“the only thing that Mr. Heath will  have in common with the Mr. Wilson of 1964”, is  a clear 
emphasis  on  the  economy.  In  many  respects,  this  was  also  the  only  true  thing  the  Heath 
administration  had  in  common  with  the  governments  that  were  run  by  Churchill,  Eden  and 
Macmillan as well. With the exception of Alec Douglas-Home, who kept serving in the Shadow 
Cabinet after his resignation, Heath's team of ministers contained none of the faces that had for so 
long  been  associated  with  the  stability  of  the  post-war  era.  The  future  Prime  Minister  was  a 
professional politician, with a good sense for public opinion, who represented a new generation of 
leaders  that  were  too  young  to  have  played  any significant  role  in  1940s  politics.  The  press 
compared Heath to Richard Nixon of the United States.5
Both know that they now depend for power and success far less than ever before 
on any definable  collective  interest  (whether  squires  or  businessmen) and far  
more on keeping the allegiance of a mass of ordinary individual people up and 
3 Ramsden, John. An Appetite for Power: A History of the Conservative Party since 1830 (London : HarperCollins, 1998): 385-386.
4 Seyd, Patrick. Factionalism in the 1970s. in Conservative Party Politics, ed. Zig Layton-Henry (London: Macmillan, 1980): 241
5 Commentary, The Times, January 29 1970.
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down the country. Mr. Heath's strength is that what the Tory Party is now offering  
/.../ is precisely what the majority of ordinary people now want.6
In the early 1970s indeed a lot of British voters were becoming increasingly attracted to the notion 
of clamping down on big government and big unions alike. With the promise that they will break 
the interventionist policies of the past, and substitute them with market solutions, Heath and his 
Cabinet  were  aiming  to  reconstruct  the  foundations  of  the  post-war  consensus.  To  their  utter 
disappointment, they would soon discover that the painstaking preparations of the previous five 
years were useless, particularly when it came to the issue of industrial relations. As the British 
historian A. J. Davies notes, “people simply did not behave as they should have done on paper”.7 
The Government's failure to convince trade unions to register their activities under the Industrial 
Relations Act of 1971 had disastrous effects on Heath's strategy to reform the British economy on 
the  basis  of  efficient  management  and  modernization,  where  the  government  would  create 
conditions for growth and trade unions would not try to oppose it.  By developing a system of 
industrial  relations based on cooperation,  not confrontation,  the Government wanted “to restore 
profitability as the central criterion of economic activity”.  Much of the central plan was dependent 
on the belief that reason will prevail,  and that with a new business-like approach to conducting 
politics (economic) problems will simply cease to exist.8
Heath's ideological posture, summed up under the 'Selsdon man' line of thought, had a much 
stronger effect on his legacy and the future of the Conservative Party than the technocratic approach 
to making politics he pursued throughout his political career.  A Better Tomorrow, a statement of 
policies the Party put forward for the purposes of the 1970 General Election, was ideologically 
much closer to what Margaret Thatcher nine years later attested to in her first manifesto, than to 
Conservatism  of  the  1960s.  To  some  extent  this  confirms  the  notion  that  the  newness  of 
Thatcherism, in the words of Evans, “was personal and political, not ideological”9. What prevented 
Heath from succeeding was characterized by some as a revival of 'anti-intellectualism' within the 
Conservative ranks and anti-Conservatism among opinion makers. The cumulative effect of this 
was  a  Government  lacking  in  resolve.  Margaret  Thatcher,  by  contrast,  had  the  backing  of  an 
intellectual revolution, with many of the main protagonists convinced that collectivism had run its 
course for too long and that the time was right to break the link between the people and the State. 
She was also blessed with a strong team of ministers, something Heath was missing since his first 
6 Ibid.
7 Davies, A.J. We, the Nation. The Conservative Party and the Pursuit of Power (London: Little, Brown & Co. 1995): 199; Clarke, Peter. Hope and 
Glory: Britain 1900-1990 (London: Allen Lane/Penguin Press, 1996): 331.
8 Norton, Philip and Arthur Aughey. Conservatives and Conservatism (London : Temple Smith,1981): 150.
9 Evans, Eric J. Thatcher and Thatcherism (London etc. : Routledge, 1997): 5.
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day at Number 10.10
Many in the Party, including Margaret Thatcher, were convinced that the Conservatives two 
consecutive General Election defeats in February and October 1974 were the result of policy U-
turns – the reversals of course the Heath Cabinet undertook in the second half of its term on issues 
like intervention by government in industry, and wage and price controls.11 For Heath, the episode 
spelled the beginning of the end of his premiership. For Thatcher, who was serving as the minister 
of education, it was a lesson in tactic and resolution, something she would use to her own political 
advantage after her first election win in 1979.
The trigger that caused Heath to reverse his Government's policy course was unemployment, 
which in January 1972 reached the psychologically important figure of one million. Realizing that 
the policy of full employment which he adhered to in his 1970 Manifesto was falling apart, Heath 
and his closest group of ministers retreated to the middle ground in hope that their problems would 
disappear.  Losing  confidence  in  his  own  non-interventionist  policies,  Heath  became  more 
corporatist, increasing government powers for intervention and using them to bail out shipbuilders 
on the Clyde and other industries. In addition to this, the Government adopted a statutory incomes 
policy  to  hold  down  inflation.12 To  contemporaries,  particularly  those  that  served  in  the 
Government, this was perceived as 'business as usual'. Many thought that the policy reversals were 
necessary in the face of extreme unionist militancy and that they were pursued on the grounds of 
securing  growth  and  competitiveness,  the  same  strategic  objectives  that  the  Government  had 
adhered to all along.13
By February 1974, when Heath suffered the third election defeat of his career, Margaret 
Thatcher  was  convinced  that  Conservative  policy  had  to  be  reconstructed  to  a  new  set  of 
specifications advocated by Sir Keith Joseph, a long-time Cabinet member who would later become 
known as the father of 'Thatcherism'. Together with him she founded the Centre for Policy Studies 
(CPS), a free-market neoliberal think tank that in many ways represented something of a counter 
weight to the Conservative Research Department. Backed by monetarist economists, Joseph became 
the leading voice of an opposition within the Opposition, gradually but effectively introducing an 
alternative  set  of  policies  influenced  by  ideas  that  came  not  from  within,  but  outside  the 
Conservative Party. Much of what later became known as Thatcherism was based on the works of 
10 Blake, Robert.  The Conservative Party from Peel to Thatcher (London: Methuen, 1985): 309-311; Ramsden, John. The Making of Conservative  
Party Policy (London : HarperCollins, 1980): 390-391.
11 Charmley, John. A History of Conservative Politics, 1900-1996 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996):194.
12 Seldon, Anthony. Conservative Century in Conservative Century: Conservative Party since 1900, ed. Anthony Seldon, and Stuart Ball (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994) 56-57.
13 Ramsden, John. An Appetite for Power: A History of the Conservative Party since 1830 (London : HarperCollins, 1998): 402.
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free-market economists that rejected Keynesian orthodoxy and the core economic principles of the 
post-war consensus.  Many of  Joseph's  ideas  were essentially reformulations  of  those raised by 
radical thinkers such as Enoch Powell, a former minister during the Macmillan era and of the most 
controversial figures in recent Conservative history, and various names associated with the Institute 
of Economic Affairs (IEA), a free-market think tank set up in the late 1950s.14 Even though men 
like  Powell  provided Thatcherism with  much of  its  language,  the  similarities  between the  two 
alternative lines of thought were never as strong as they might have seemed to contemporaries. 
Powell's reservations on the issues of race, immigration and Britain's relationship with America had 
no value to Thatcher or her closest allies. Many Thatcherites, nevertheless, admired Powell for his 
early  attacks  on  economic  planning,  nationalization,  high  government  expenditure,  exchange 
controls and most importantly any government policy on prices or incomes.15
Acknowledging the Powell factor, John Charmley argues there was nothing really new about 
Joseph's ideas, except for his leading role and the presence of Mrs. Thatcher, who was “the one 
missing, yet vital ingredient” separating Joseph from setting the Party on a new course. Still, the 
first  few years  after  Heath  departure  were  seen  as  a  time  of  ideological  consolidation  for  the 
traditionally  non-ideological  Conservatives.  In  an  article,  the  Times  described  how  Tories  had 
“abandoned their antipathy towards ideas” thanks to the work of the CPS and Keith Joseph, and 
started reaching out to those parts of society that had the power to change public opinion. Nobody,  
however, could predict whether the Conservative experiment would work. A particular problem, as 
the newspaper noted, was the British electorate's deep distrust of all ideology.16 By 1978, the Party 
had already published two major policy documents, each with the intention “to demonstrate the 
different face of Tory policy in outline, if not in detail”.17 The first, called the The Right Approach,  
was published in October 1976, and essentially represented a compromise between various groups 
within the Shadow Cabinet. It offered a very small sense of direction as far as economic policy was 
concerned.  Many  of  the  anti-statist  and  anti-interventionist  ideas  that  were  later  captured  in 
Thatcher's  first  manifesto  were  presented  the  following  year,  in  a  document  called  The  Right  
Approach to the Economy.18 Whether any of these documents actually helped the Conservatives win 
the next election remains uncertain.
For all her leadership skills and resolution, Margaret Thatcher was an accidental Leader of 
14 Charmley, John. A History of Conservative Politics, 1900-1996 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996): 196-197; Heath, Edward. The Course of My Life  
(London : Hodder & Stoughton, 1998): 521; Thatcher, Margaret. The Path to Power (London: HarperCollins 1993): 250.
15 Vinen, Richard. Thatcher's Britain:The Politics and Social Upheval in the 1980s (London: Simon & Schuster, 2009):  51.
16The Centre of Tory Thinking, The Times, February 13th 1978.
17 Ramsden, John. An Appetite for Power: A History of the Conservative Party since 1830 (London : HarperCollins, 1998): 433.
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the Party, a substitute for Joseph who first considered running against Heath, but later bowed out of 
the race. Most Conservative MPs decided to support her leadership bid not because they thought she 
could lead, but because they were convinced Heath needed to go. Thatcher would later write that 
she could not have become Leader of the Opposition nor achieve what she did as Prime Minister 
without Joseph standing by her side.19  Her success in the 1979 General Election, by contrast, was 
not an accident rather a product of luck. For all the troubles it caused the country, the Winter of 
Discontent helped the Conservatives further articulate their ideas to the point where most of the 
electorate would find them credible. Months of strikes by public sector trade unions targeted at 
Labour's efforts to curb inflation by enforcing limits on pay rises, resulted in a drastic change of the  
political landscape. Many of those who voted Conservative in 1979, Evans explained, did so “on the 
basis of retrospective rather than prospective evaluations”. In other words, it was mainly a protest 
vote against James Callaghan's Government and unionist militancy. The full nature of Thatcherism 
only became apparent long after the election. While the 1979 Conservative Manifesto gave clues 
about Thatcher's ultimate aims, her new brand of economic realism remained largely abstract.20
3.2 Economic realism  
For Conservatives, the 1970s among other things presented a period of rising disagreement about 
how much economic realism should there be in the Party's central policy pronouncements. Views 
expressed about the tone of one of the earliest drafts of the 1970 Manifesto significantly contrast 
those that became prevalent five years later, at the start of Ted Heath's second term as Leader of the 
Opposition. Many in the Party were convinced that a document, announcing big changes in taxation 
and  a  shift  to  selectivity  in  social  policy21 had  all  the  ingredients  to  make  life  miserable  for 
Conservatives and ruin their chances of winning the next election. The relatively small group of 
people who actually read manifestos would be perplexed by the sudden dose of frankness. Members 
like Geoffrey Block, a long-time research officer at the CRD, were quite right to argue for a less 
stringent approach. The majority of the electorate, he explained, had by now forgotten that elections 
could  also  be  fought  on  far  more  contentious  and  divisive  issues.  Too  much  frankness  could 
encourage them to flee.22 Too vague of a policy, and the result would be no different. Finding the 
proper balance between the two was key to securing a strong and viable alternative to the Labour 
19 Charmley, John.  A History of Conservative Politics, 1900-1996 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996): 197;  Thatcher, Margaret.  The Path to Power 
(London: HarperCollins 1993): 251;   Sir Keith refuses to be drawn on Mr. Heath's future, The Times, October 25th 1974. 
20 Norton, Philip. Margaret Thatcher, 1975-9, in Leaders of the Opposition: From Churhchill to Cameron, ed. Timothy Heppell (Basingstoke etc. : 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012): 108; Evans, Eric J. Thatcher and Thatcherism (London etc. : Routledge, 1997): 16.; For more information on the Winter 
of Discontent visit https://libcom.org /history/1978-1979-winter-of-discontent
21 Ramsden, John. The Making of Conservative Party Policy (London : HarperCollins, 1980): 275
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camp.
Conservative records belonging to this period contain some of the most detailed information 
about how the Party structured its manifestos. Eighteen months after the 1970 General Election, the 
Conservative Research Department published a paper on future policy making which included a 
detailed list of features that every manifesto should contain. These were: a central theme, several 
major proposals, a number of minor proposals also called “nuggets”, an attack against  the current 
Government’s record known as a 'knocking copy', and last but not least the record of the previous 
(or current) Conservative Government. Even though the first references for these requirements are 
found well into the 1970s, there is nothing particularly new about them. Conservative terminology 
aside, most of the manifestos mentioned in this thesis contained all of the listed elements in one 
form or another. If the Party was in opposition, it made sure that its manifesto contained a 'knocking 
copy', where all the Government’s mistakes and decisions that could be used for political purposes 
were  listed  and  condemned.  A knocking  copy  played  a  smaller  role  if  the  Government  was 
Conservative; in that case the Party had to focus its attention on producing and presenting a good 
and defensible record which was regarded as the foundation of the manifesto on which everything 
else was built. Without a good record, the CRD explained, new proposals had little or no credibility 
and were destined to fail.23
Policy reversals seemed particularly hard to digest since their presence alone indicated that 
the government's record was flawed. This was the case in 1974, the year when Conservatives lost 
two  general  elections  in  a  row.  In  order  to  lower  the  rising  level  of  unemployment,  Heath's  
Government performed a series of policy U-turns, effectively admitting that the policy prescriptions 
it introduced at the beginning of its run were useless. In terms of policy making, it was a sudden, 
albeit ironic development. In early 1972 the Conservative Research Department announced that the 
Party had fulfilled most of the promises made in its Manifesto, A Better Tomorrow, and that it was 
on  course  to  meet  virtually all  of  its  policy commitments  by the  end of  1973.24 According to 
Ramsden, policies that were successfully implemented included joining the European Economic 
Community (EEC),  tax  reforms,  housing finance,  restructuring of  local  government  and of  the 
machinery of government, and of course the flagship policy that was the Industrial Relations Act of 
1971.  The  fact  that  some of  these  measures  failed  to  deliver  their  anticipated  results  was  not 
particularly surprising. What was hard to understand was the Party's reaction. In terms of election 
strategy, the Party's decision to change the course of its policy represented nothing ordinary. Yet 
Heath and many of those who stayed loyal to him throughout the period 1970-1974 believed that 
reversals of policy were not just  good for the country but for the Party as well.25 He certainly 
wouldn't be the first or the last Conservative Prime Minister to admit a mistake. Nevertheless, there 
23 Oxford, Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archive: shelfmark: ACP72/74.
24 Ibid.  
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was nothing humble or encouraging about the scale of reversal he undertook. The reintroduction of 
wage and price controls and a series of government interventions in industry put Heath on the spot. 
Combined  with  a  general  lack  of  ideas,  the  Conservative  Party's  complete  failure  to  exercise 
prudence in making promises spelled trouble in terms of its re-election prospects.26
The February and October 1974 Conservative Manifestos, entitled  Firm Action for a Fair  
Britain  and Putting Britain First,  were essentially based on the same theme: national unity. The 
original drafts for both documents were prepared by Nigel Lawson, then a senior Conservative 
journalist who the Party recruited specifically for the purpose of getting its message out.27  Despite 
their similar content, the documents were considered miles apart in terms of their tone. Firm Action 
for a Fair Britain embodied the ambivalence of the Party's position by focusing exclusively on what  
the other  side was prepared to offer.  The Conservatives'  decisions  to run a  negative campaign, 
which would reveal the extreme nature of the political and economic situation Britain was facing as 
a consequence of the 1973 oil  crisis, resulted in a document similar in approach to Churchill's 
Manifesto of 1945. Some members of the Party thought that Lawson's draft was far too radical to 
ever appeal to moderates. There was also no clear definition of what the Party would do in terms of  
reversing the situation after the election. None of those who voiced their concerns, however, wanted 
to propose an alternative set of policies, something that would actually deal with the crisis in the 
country head on. As Ramsden explained six years later, the price of doing anything was just too 
high.
/.../ most Conservatives shared the sense that the country and Party were at a  
hinge of fate, but they also shared a reluctance to adopt Draconian measures  
against  the  unions.  Hence,  they  drifted  towards  a  crisis  election  without  
proposals that were of crisis proportions.28
The cumulative result of this was a manifesto which spoke of a Government that had nothing to 
offer except the status quo. The Conservatives essentially admitted that their sole task in office 
would be to guide the country safely through the difficult period that lied ahead. They were anxious 
to appear strong and defiant in their conflict with trade unions and miners. Nevertheless they failed 
to  project  the  militancy of  their  opponents  as  one  of  the  causes,  not  the  consequences  of  the 
25 Ramsden, John. An Appetite for Power: A History of the Conservative Party since 1830 (London : HarperCollins, 1998): 402-403.
26 Butler, David. British General Elections since 1945 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989): 87.
27  Nigel Lawson was one of the first notable examples of people from outside the Party participating in high profile Conservative affairs. The number 
of people who had no previous association with the Party, but were willing to help Conservatives defeat Labour at the next election particularly 
increased in later years, when Keith Joseph and Margaret Thatcher tried everything to associate the Party with businesses and companies from the 
private sector. Joseph's correspondence with Chris Patten, the Director of the CRD, demonstrates how the Tories were keen to seek advice and 
examples of good practice not only from British individuals but foreigners as well. For a more detailed account see Private Papers of Keith Joseph, 
Oxford, Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archive: shelfmark: KJ 8/15.
28 Ramsden, John. The Making of Conservative Party Policy (London : HarperCollins, 1980): 302.
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country's mounting problems.29
By summer  1974,  the  rising  fragmentation  within  the  Shadow  Cabinet  was  becoming 
increasingly apparent, especially when it came to presenting policy priorities. Keith Joseph became 
the  main  protagonist  of  a  different  Conservative  ideology,  which  argued  that  Heath's  a  priori 
commitment  to  full  employment was wrong and was in  itself  the cause for hyperinflation that 
Britain experienced in the past couple of years.30 In a letter to Michael Fraser discussing the fourth 
draft  of  the  October  1974  Manifesto,  Joseph  suggested  that  the  tone  of  every  reference  to 
unemployment should carefully avoid implying that the Party will necessarily be able to prevent 
it.31  The majority of the Shadow Cabinet, however, remained convinced that curing inflation did 
not necessarily mean increasing unemployment. Heath believed that the state could still guarantee 
jobs  with  the  pursuit  of  expansion,  and  lower  inflation  at  the  same  time.  While  he  seemed 
determined to maintain a high level of employment in the economy, Heath nevertheless realized that 
there  had  to  be  moderation  in  pay  increases  if  a  future  Conservative  government  was  to  be 
successful  in  its  fight  against  inflation.  Stagflation  and unemployment  were  considered  all  but 
inevitable if wages continued to rise.32
The October Manifesto eventually included the warning that “in the absence of a viable 
prices and incomes policy any government would have to take harsher financial  and economic 
measures than would otherwise be needed”.33 By exercising prudence, although not to the degree 
proposed  by  Joseph,  the  Party  was  using  its  manifesto  to  hedge  any  potential  future 
disappointments. Much like in previous elections, the manifesto was serving the Conservatives as a 
form of insurance – an anchor that fixed their ideas in place.34 To Heath's bitter dislike, economic 
realism was slowly but steadily returning to the forefront of Conservative policy making.
In a paper, published a year after the October 1974 General Election, Joseph was still talking 
about the need for an economically realistic Conservative policy. This time around he could be sure 
that his words were heard by the Party, including every single Shadow Cabinet member. With Heath 
gone and Margaret  Thatcher  in the leader's  seat,  his  ideas on Monetarism were at  last  gaining 
29 Campbell, John. Edward Heath: A Biography (London: Cape, 1993): 600-601.
30 Evans, Eric J. Thatcher and Thatcherism (London etc. : Routledge, 1997): 7; Sir Keith Joseph Blames full employment policies for inflation, The 
Times, September 6th 1974.
31 Correspondence between Joseph and Fraser, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archive: shelfmark: CRD 4/30/4/41.
32 Putting Britain First – Briefing, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archive: shelfmark: CRD 4/30/4/45
33 For full text of the 1974 Conservative manifesto visit:  
34 Harrison, Brian. The Transformation of British Politics 1860-1995 (Oxford etc.: Oxford University Press, 1996): 314.
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traction.35 Soon there was little doubt in anyone's mind that the falling standard of living would 
have serious implications on government expenditure. Joseph was convinced that the Party needed 
to propose cuts in public spending. This, together with solving the union problem, presented the 
only way to secure Britain's  economic recovery and to  preserve  the  Party's  credibility.34 Many 
Conservative officials, including Thatcher, were reluctant to share Heath's view simply because they 
felt that it was not realistic to expect a solution to the union problem any time soon.36
While the showdown with trade unions was eventually postponed to Thatcher's second term, 
another question, identical to the one Geoffrey Block provided an answer for several years before, 
soon occupied everyone's mind. How should the Party present controversial proposals without the 
risk of alienating the electorate? This time it would be Geoffrey Howe, the Shadow Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, who would expose the Party's difficult task and the chances it had of succeeding in 
its new approach. As Howe explained, most people cared for lower taxes, and many were becoming 
fed up with Labour's fiscal legislation and the growth of the public sector. These were powerful 
factors that could improve the Conservatives chances at  the next election.  However,  there were 
negative aspects to the new set of policies as well, especially when it came to spending cuts which 
most people were deeply reluctant to accept37.  Howe's warning that a detailed list  of proposals 
exposes the party to potential  attacks from opponents served as an example of traditional Tory 
concerns that resurfaced in the years leading up to the 1979 General Election.
Conservative records, Margaret Thatcher's memoirs and her personal papers tell the story 
behind the 1979 Manifesto. The drafting process initially consisted of several stages, starting with 
the gathering of ideas that later formed the original draft of the document which was co-written by 
Chris Patten, the Director of the CRD, and Angus Maude, the Department's Chairman. In April  
1978, the CRD presented Thatcher with a detailed explanation about how the presentation and the 
structure  of  the  future  manifesto  might  look  like.  First,  the  manifesto  needed  a  main  theme, 
something to set it apart from the rest. Second, it was best to leave details outside. Third, the Party's  
proposals needed to sound sufficiently distinct from those of the Labour Party. Above all, Thatcher 
had  to  decide  what  kind  of  policy course she  would pursue.  Would  she seek to  evoke radical 
35 Keith Joseph's correspondence with CRD research officers demonstrates how his economic views were quickly gaining interest within the 
Conservative ranks. By January 1976, discussions Joseph was having about the importance of money in influencing the behaviour of the economy 
were problematizing the scale of the Public sector. Joseph was convinced that the Public sector had to contract in order for the strugling private sector 
to expand. When it came to economic issues, Joseph searched for advice and opinions both inside and outside the Party. His personal papers, for 
instance, reveal how he maintained relationships with consultancy firms in order to hear what they had to say about economic forecasts. Overall, 
Keith supported including party outsiders in the policy making process. For more details see Oxford, Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archive: 
shelfmark: KJ 10/5. 
34 Paper: Policy Group Exercise, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archive: shelfmark: ACP 3/21
36 Balen, Malcolm. Kenneth Clarke (London: Fourth Estate, 1994): 106; Thatcher, Margaret. The Path to Power (London: HarperCollins 1993): 402.
37 Paper by Geoffrey Howe; Oxford, Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archive: shelfmark: ACP 3/21.
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change? Or would she like to be cautious in her steps, moving slowly towards her eventual goal? 
The Research Department advised Thatcher to consider any possible problems of implementation 
that might occur after the election and their effect on the Party's support38. Keith Joseph, on the 
other hand, gave her more specific advice. He warned her about coming across too negatively with 
voters; the Party needed to tell the truth about Labour's mistakes, but also offer a positive alternative 
in the form of tax cuts and government non-intervention39.
The manifesto essentially proved to be a document Thatcher and her team could mould 
however they choose. But before they could do anything, they had to be clear about what they, as a 
party,  wanted  to  achieve.  When  Thatcher  first  received  Patten  and  Maude's  original  draft  she 
discovered the connective function of the manifesto: the fact that it was too vague, she explained in 
her memoirs, was an instant reminder of the Party's failure to come up with “clear and coherent 
policies in some crucial areas, particularly the trade unions”40. From that point on her objectives 
would be far more obvious.
With the help of a series of strikes that took place in the winter of 1978-1979 Thatcher and 
Joseph were finally in a position to consolidate the Conservative Party around one central idea:
The balance of opinion in the Shadow Cabinet,  following rather than leading  
opinion in the country, was now that we could and should obtain a mandate to clip 
the wings of the trade union militants. Similarly /.../ the collapse of Labour's pay 
policy made it easier to argue that the whole approach of prices and incomes  
controls /.../ should be abandoned. Above all, I was sure that there had been over 
the winter a sea-change and that our manifesto had to catch that tide.41
To prove her point, Thatcher compared the first draft of August 1978 and the final version of the 
Manifesto, which was published in April 1979. Indeed, the first text was much more conciliatory in 
tone that the second one, which was clearly moving away from the belief that the solution for the  
union problem had to  be sought  outside  the  parameters  of  law.  Citing the  final  version of  the 
Manifesto, Thatcher was convinced that “if the law can be used to confer privileges, it can and 
should also be used to establish obligations”42. With regard to incomes policy, she was somewhat 
less  successful,  evoking  opposition  from  the  likes  of  Geoffrey  Howe  who  advocated  an 
establishment of a special economic forum, based on a model of 'concerted action' used to great 
38 Leader's Consultative Committee, Cambridge, Churchill Archive Centre: shelfmark:  THCR 2-7-1-5.
39 Election Strategy – Industry, Cambridge, Churchill Archive Centre: shelfmark:  THCR 2-7-1-14.
40 Thatcher, Margaret. The Path to Power (London: HarperCollins 1993): 435.
41 Ibid. 435
42 Ibid. 436
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effect in Western Germany43.  In the end, the incomes policy was not agreed to the point where it 
could proudly stand on its own. Instead, the Shadow Cabinet decided to put it to rest at least until 
after  the  election  was over.  The final  version  of  the  document,  which  was simply titled  1979 
Conservative Party General Election Manifesto, helped the Tories convey a clear impression of 
what they intended to do in government, while many aspects of implementation were left to the 
individual's imagination44.
 
3.3 Conservative consolidation
The  final  part  of  this  chapter  will  show how the  transformation  of  long-term policy priorities 
reinforced  the  sense  of  intra  party  cohesion  which  this  study highlighted  as  one  of  the  most 
important functions of Conservative election manifestos.
At the start of the 1970s, the Conservative Research Department predicted that economic 
and employment problems would continue to dominate the British political scene and influence 
public opinion for years to come. The rise in the level of unemployment, which was becoming 
significantly more  apparent  in  1972,  was not  perceived as  a  general  problem until  much later. 
Instead, it was regarded as a specific issue limited either to a few select parts of the country or  
particular economic sectors. How long this kind of situation would last was hard to say. The general 
feeling was, however, that the low level of unemployment associated with the post-war consensus 
was slowly but surely becoming a thing of the past45. When the decade was nearing its end the 
pursuit  of  full  employment  was simply abandoned as  a  prime  objective  of  government  policy. 
Instead, the Thatcher administration focused all of its attention on lowering inflation46. It claimed it 
did so in the name of securing more jobs. In the 1979 Manifesto, unemployment, inflation and 
public spending were linked together in a show of Conservative monetarist ideas.
The  State  takes  too  much of  the  nation's  income;  its  share  must  be  steadily  
reduced.  When  it  spends  and borrows  too  much,  taxes,  interest  rates,  prices  
and unemployment rise so that in the long run there is less wealth with which  
to improve our standard of living and our social services47.
43 Ibid. 403
44 Ramsden, John. An Appetite for Power: A History of the Conservative Party since 1830 (London : HarperCollins, 1998): 435.
45 CRD Paper on Future Policy Making; Oxford, Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archive: shelfmark: ACP72/74.
46 Seldon, Anthony. Conservative Century in Conservative Century: Conservative Party since 1900, ed. Anthony Seldon, and Stuart Ball (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994): 59.
47 For  full  text  of  the  1979  Conservative  General  Election  Manifesto  visit  http://www.conservativemanifesto.com/1979/1979-
conservative-manifesto.shtml
48
The emergence of the 1979 Manifesto was not only important in terms of laying down new policies, 
but in resolving intra party tensions which grew out of reactions to Margaret Thatcher's and Keith 
Joseph's radical ideas48.
The situation proved similar to that of 1966, when Heath's manifesto took the form of a 
neutral declaration, persuading Conservatives to focus on those priorities they could actually agree 
on.  While Heath tried to distance himself from ideological issues, the challenging circumstances of 
1978-79 gave Thatcher enough momentum to push the Party further to the right on the spectrum of 
economic ideas. The 1979 election took place in a time when Britain was experiencing the most  
serious economic and social crisis since the end of the Second World War. Before Thatcher and her 
followers could seize the opportunity to guide the country out of the fog and into a new era, they 
needed to convince their own Conservative kind that the whole exercise would be worth it in the 
end. For Thatcher this was an unnatural experience. Preserving unity among Conservative ranks 
was never among her top priorities. Many forget that her own story was one of dissent. Historians 
generally agree that from 1975 to 1979 the Conservative Party saw a rise in bitter disputes, but none 
of them came even close to derailing the Thatcher's absolute devotion to her cause49. In the end, the 
manifesto was used to rally the rank and file, and give them something to believe in. On the back of 
the 1979 document, consensus could once again flourish inside the Party, at least until the election 
was over.
The next Conservative manifesto, it seems, would not prove that much different in terms of 
seeking internal coherence. From a purely functional perspective, the 1983 document, entitled The 
Challenge  of  Our  Times,  bared  many  resemblances  with  Thatcher's  first  manifesto.  Political 
commentators described it as a consensus document, where economic and financial realism were 
once again the predominant Conservative themes. The only real attribute it lacked in comparison 
with its predecessor was candidness. Butler and Kavanagh's analysis of the 1983 General Election 
showed  how the  Party  and  its  leader  were  moving  towards  producing  and  presenting  a  more 
vaguely defined set of priorities:
/.../ Mrs. Thatcher in 1983, unlike her campaign in 1979, did little to prepare the 
electorate for future possible sacrifices and much to suggest (without explicit  
commitment)  that  these  would  not  be  required.  The  1979 manifesto  had laid  
the  groundwork  for  making  hard  decisions  acceptable  and  justifying  a  later  
'stay the course' campaign. The 1983 manifesto did not.50
48 Butler, David and Dennis Kavanagh.  The British General Election of 1979 (London: Macmillan,1980): 144-145
49 Evans, Eric J. Thatcher and Thatcherism (London etc. : Routledge, 1997): 42-43
50 Butler, David and Dennis Kavanagh. The British General Election of 1983 (London: Macmillan,1984): 41.
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Could this ambiguity have any effect on Conservative prospects if Thatcher a year earlier hadn't 
seccurred  a  military  victory in  the  South  Atlantic?  It  is  hard  to  say,  although  her  task  would 
probably have been a lot harder. What is certain, in 1983 the promotional purpose of the Party's 
central  policy declaration was significantly limited thanks to  the success of the Falklands War. 
Margaret Thatcher's credibility and support within her own Cabinet and the country were at a record 
high, giving the Conservative Party enough clout to steam confidently ahead to the next general 
election.
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Conclusion
This study has traced and examined the development of the Conservative election manifesto during 
the post-war period leading up to the end of the first Thatcher Government. Unlike those historical  
accounts that fail to go beyond the sphere of political propaganda in their attempts to explain the 
changing nature of these documents, its main concern has been to examine the reasons why election 
manifestos have for so long stood at the very centre of Conservative policy making. To understand 
their importance in the context of Tory politics, this study has demonstrated how these publications 
came to life under different party administrations.  For this  purpose Conservative Party records, 
including private papers of Prime Ministers, have been studied and analysed in order to provide a 
first-hand look at how policy decisions were made at the top level. Each of the three chapters has 
shown the tendency of the Conservative Party to produce election manifestos based on a number of 
contrasting  purposes.  By  tracing  the  emergence  of  individual  publications,  the  study  has 
demonstrated the effect these had on wider aspects of policy making, electoral strategy and party 
management,  essentially  confirming what  Iain  Macleod’s  wrote  in  1964,  that  the  final  product 
“reflects not only political aspirations but the interests, hesitations and even foibles of a composite 
authorship”.1 
Records show that many of these purposes became apparent early during each gestation 
process. This usually started with determining policy priorities and developing convincing themes 
that would set the tone of the manifesto and make it more appealing to the average voter. As chapter 
one has revealed, the process was conceived in the late 1940s; from that point on the Conservative 
manifesto became a product of collective efforts, where virtually all of the Party's resources were 
used to determine an influential,  coherent and above all  convincing set of ideas and proposals. 
While manifestos were usually drafted by representatives of the Research Department, Advisory 
Committee on Policy, or even individuals from outside the Conservative ranks, the final product 
was often heavily influenced by the leader of the Party. Leaders were always kept up to speed about 
1 Barnes and Cockett 1994, 357
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the progress of the drafting process. When it was time to decide, which policies were to be included  
in the manifesto, they had the final word. Party records confirm that the choices the leaders and 
authors  of  manifestos  made  were  influenced  by  considerations  that  had  as  much  to  do  with 
garnering voter support than with party management. What each of the three chapters has observed 
is the Conservatives remarkable ability for confronting change both in terms of developing and 
introducing new content to their existing set of priorities while at the same time achieving a high 
degree of intra party cohesion. Conservative manifestos, particularly those written in 1950, 1966, 
1970 and 1979 when the Tories were in opposition, in their draft phase served as platforms for 
confronting controversial views and opinions, which eventually needed to be streamlined into more 
or less convincing themes. The gestation period of each of these documents saw drafts rewritten and 
revised several times in order to achieve a sustainable balance of ideas that permitted the Party to 
speak with a single, convincing voice. For Heath and Thatcher, and to a certain degree Churchill as 
well, the drafting process served as a litmus test, where the leaders were able to assess, but also 
influence in which direction the Party was headed. 
For Heath, the 1966 election manifesto represented not only a way of controlling discussions 
about  policy  priorities  but  also  limiting  the  scale  of  debates  about  the  fundamentals  of 
Conservatism, particularly those concerned with economic issues. His careful approach, devised to 
achieve a satisfactory level of intra party cohesion, resulted in a document which was depicted as 
vague and ambiguous, lacking any solid commitments that would set the Conservatives apart from 
their political rivals. Compared to the first two decades after the War, election manifestos published 
between 1966 and 1979 were conceived in an environment of increasingly contrasting views. When 
the post-war political consensus slowly started nearing its end, the level of intra party cohesion 
followed a similar path. The reasons for this are less important than the final outcome, which saw 
election manifestos become the focus of even greater attention. The result,  in essence, confirms 
Cooke's notion that the difficulties in presenting policy “only become overwhelming when a party 
lacks clarity of purpose”.2 Furthermore, it implies the existence of a correlation between intra party 
cohesion and unambiguous policy direction.  
Clarity of purpose was also useful in situations when the Party needed to protect policy 
priorities or the mandate it received following an election win. This represented perhaps the most 
valuable and important function of the Conservative election manifesto, where policies would come 
to life or experience an uncertain death. Whichever commitments were included in a declaration of 
policy were there simply because the Party believed they could be fulfilled. Those which were 
thought to be too contentious, too expensive or not in line with dominant ideological streams were 
omitted. The push for full employment, for years a centre-piece of Conservative policy, by the end 
2 Cooke, Alistair B. Introduction, in Conservative Party General Election Manifestos 1900-1997, by Iain Dale (Abingdon: Routledge 2000).
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of the 1970s experienced a familiar outcome when it was replaced by a focus on inflation.3 Even 
though the Party had been promoting monetarist ideas for some time, they only became part of their 
central  strategy  when  they  were  written  down  in  the  1979  manifesto.  Once  full  employment 
disappeared from official declarations, there was hardly any way for it to return. Even though it still  
had electoral appeal, politically and economically it could no longer be sustained. In the interest of 
expediency,  future  research  could  focus  on  similar  policies  that  defined  the  post-war  era,  and 
examine them in the context of the Conservative quest for prudence. 
Another important aspect that would also deserve more attention is the publicity value of 
election manifestos. Taking into account the fact that these publications were widely distributed in 
the  popular  press,  researchers  could  easily  assume  they  had  at  least  some  influence  on  voter 
behaviour,  especially  if  they  were  following  Downs'  economic  theory  of  democracy.4 Yet,  as 
Conservative records reveal, there existed a large amount of scepticism regarding their true value in 
terms  of  garnering  electoral  support.  Party  officials  that  were  involved  in  preparing  these 
declarations  were  generally  convinced  that  the  number  of  people  who  actually  read  what  the 
Conservatives  write  in  their  programme  was  very  small.  In  some  cases,  the  recipients  were 
identified by officials as members of the “informed public”: those individuals and groups who could 
influence  the  opinion  of  the  masses.  In  many ways  these  seemed  to  represent  the  Party's  real 
audience. 
What this study has highlighted is the versatility of the Conservative manifesto. Whatever 
the Party choose to record in or omit from its central policy declaration, the end result stayed the 
same:  the  set  of  commitments  served  as  a  foundation  on  which  all  decisions  were  based.  In 
situations where Conservatives needed to reassess their mandate they could always look back at 
what they set out to do in the very beginning. The balance between movement and stability, which 
Norton and Aughey argue set Tories and their “limited style of politics” apart from the temerity of 
their  political  adversaries,5 also  presents  one of  the  defying characteristics  of  the  Conservative 
manifesto. The interests and hesitations that went into the making of these documents, demonstrated 
in the constant search for prudence, give a sense about the importance of their role, not just in 
relaying but defining what the Conservative Party stood for and against.  
 
3 Seldon, Anthony. Conservative Century in Conservative Century: Conservative Party since 1900, ed. Anthony Seldon, and Stuart Ball (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994): 57-59. 
4 Downs was the first to make the connection between voters policy preferences and party actions. The main premise of his mandate theory is that 
voters judge parties on the basis of their record in office. For more details see Mansergh, Lucy and Robert Thomson. Election Pledges, Party 
Competition and Policymaking, Comparative Politics 39 (Apr., 2007): 311-329. 
5 Norton, Philip and Arthur Aughey. Conservatives and Conservatism (London : Temple Smith,1981): 280.
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